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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article analyzes the initial efforts of the Federal Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) to implement the essential mental health and substance use 
disorder services benefit required by section 1302(b)(1)(E) of the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA)1 and proposes the adoption of a comprehensive and specific essential 
mental health and substance use disorder benefit set. At a minimum, the benefit set 
should cover medically necessary and evidence-based inpatient and outpatient 
mental healthcare services, inpatient substance abuse detoxification services, 
inpatient and outpatient substance abuse rehabilitation services, emergency mental 
healthcare services, prescription drugs for mental health conditions, participation in 
psychiatric disease management programs, and community-based mental healthcare 
services. 
This Article builds on three previous articles that have proposed reforms of 
federal and state mental health parity laws and mandatory mental health and 
substance use disorder benefit laws. The first article in this series challenged the less 
comprehensive public and private health insurance benefits that historically have 
been available to individuals who have illnesses traditionally classified as mental 
and proposed changes to federal statutes and regulations governing Medicare, 
Medicaid, self-funded non-federal governmental health plans, small group health 
plans, large group health plans, and grandfathered health plans.2 The first article 
proposed extending federal mental health parity law and mandatory mental health 
and substance use disorder benefits to all public healthcare program beneficiaries 
and private health plan members.3 The second article in the series justified and 
proposed amendments to divergent state mental health parity laws and offered a 
uniform mental health parity law for consideration by state legislatures.4 The third 
article provided additional support for my earlier proposal to extend federal mental 
health parity law and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits to 
all public healthcare program beneficiaries and private health plan members.5 The 
third article grounded such support in health-related doctrine outside the context of 
mental health insurance law (including disability discrimination law, civil rights and 
                                                           
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010) (to be codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Section 1302(b)(1)(E) of the 
Affordable Care Act provides: “The Secretary [of HHS] shall define the essential health benefits, 
except that such benefits shall include at least the following general categories and the items and 
services covered within the categories: . . . (E) Mental health and substance use disorder services, 
including behavioral health treatment.”  
2 See Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health 
Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2012). 
3 See id. 
4 See Stacey A. Tovino, Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 455 (2011). 
5 See Stacey A. Tovino, Further Support for Mental Health Parity Law and Mandatory Mental 
Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 147 (2012). 
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human rights law, health information confidentiality law, and child and adult health 
and welfare law) as well as international, national, state, and professional definitions 
of “health.”6 The third article also contextualized remaining mental health benefit 
disparities in terms of the centuries-old mind-body problem and the stigma that 
continues to be associated with mental illness.7 
At the time these three articles were written, HHS has not yet attempted to 
implement the essential health benefits provision in section 1302 of ACA (the “EHB 
Provision”), which requires exchange-offered qualified health plans, non-exchange-
offered individual health plans, non-exchange-offered small group health plans, 
Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans, and state basic health plans 
to cover at least ten general categories of health services.8 The ten required 
categories of services include ambulatory patient services, emergency services, 
hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance use 
disorder services (including behavioral health treatment), prescription drugs, 
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices, laboratory services, preventive 
and wellness services and chronic disease management, and pediatric services 
(including oral and vision care) (collectively, the “EHB Package”).9 
During the last year, HHS has taken initial steps to implement the EHB 
Provision. As discussed in more detail in Parts III.D and III.E, infra, HHS requested 
guidance from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) on the criteria and methods that 
should be used to determine and update the EHB Package.10 In response, the IOM 
formed the Committee on Defining and Revising an Essential Health Benefits 
Package for Qualified Health Plans (“Committee”).11 The Committee responded by 
providing opportunities for the public to comment on the EHB Package through two 
different venues,12 including through a Web-distributed questionnaire relating to the 
EHB Package13 and through public workshops held on January 13-14, 2011, in 
Washington, D.C., and on March 2, 2011, in Costa Mesa, California.14 The speakers 
invited to these workshops included experts from federal and state government, 
employers, insurers, healthcare providers, consumers, and healthcare researchers.15 
On August 29, 2011, the Committee released a report entitled, Perspectives on 
Essential Health Benefits: Workshop Report (“Workshop Report”), which 
summarized the speaker presentations from the D.C. and Costa Mesa workshops but 
did not contain the Committee’s own recommendations regarding the EHB 
Package.16 
On October 7, 2011, the Committee released its own consensus report entitled, 
Essential Health Benefits: Balancing Coverage and Costs (“Consensus Report”).17 
                                                           
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
9 See id. § 1302(b)(1)(A)-(J). 
10 INST. OF MED., PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: WORKSHOP REPORT 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter WORKSHOP REPORT]. 
11 Id. at 1-2. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2, 161 app. B (“Web-Based Questions for Public Input on Determination of Essential 
Health Benefits.”). 
14 Id. at 2 box S-1. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 15. 
17 INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011) 
[hereinafter CONSENSUS REPORT]. 
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In the Consensus Report, the Committee recommended that the Secretary of HHS 
(“Secretary”) define the EHB Package to reflect the scope and design of health 
benefits offered by small employers.18 The Committee also identified criteria for the 
content of the aggregate EHB Package and specific components of the EHB 
Package,19 as well as four policy foundations that should guide the Secretary in 
determining the EHB Package, including economics, ethics, population-based 
health, and evidence-based practice.20 Finally, the Committee made five specific sets 
of recommendations. The Committee first recommended that the Secretary establish 
a specific EHB Package benchmarked to a typical small employer plan, modified as 
necessary to reflect the ten ACA-required benefit categories, and guided by a 
national average premium target.21 The Committee’s second through fifth 
recommendations related to establishing a framework for obtaining and analyzing 
data necessary for monitoring and implementing the EHB Package, promoting state 
innovation, updating the EHB Package, and creating a National Benefits Advisory 
Council (NBAC).22 
Following the release of the Consensus Report, HHS held an additional series of 
“listening sessions” with consumers, providers, employers, plans, state 
representatives, and other stakeholders in different cities across the United States.23 
On December 16, 2011, HHS released its Essential Health Benefits Bulletin (“EHB 
Bulletin”).24 The EHB Bulletin provides information and solicits comments on a 
regulatory approach that HHS plans to propose to define the EHB Package.25 In the 
EHB Bulletin, HHS explains its intent not to propose one comprehensive, specific 
benefit package for all health plans in the nation to follow.26 Instead, HHS intends to 
leave the states broad discretion in defining the EHB Package by allowing each state 
to select a benchmark plan in that state.27 The selected benchmark plan would serve 
as a reference plan, reflecting both the scope of services and any limits offered by a 
typical employer plan in that state.28 HHS intends to allow health plans to make 
adjustments to the benchmarked benefits (including adjustments to the specific 
services covered and to any quantitative limits provided) and is considering allowing 
health plans to substitute services both within and across the ten ACA-required 
benefit categories.29  
This Article analyzes the initial steps taken by HHS to implement the EHB 
Provision,30 with a focus on the essential mental health and substance use disorder 
                                                           
18 Id. at 2. 
19 Id. at 3-12. 
20 Id. at 4 fig.S-1. 
21 Id. at 90. 
22 Id. at 8-12.  
23 CTR. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 3 (2011) [hereinafter EHB BULLETIN], available at 
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1.  
26 Id. at 8-12; see also Rebecca Farley, Essential Health Benefits: What Does the New HHS 
Guidance Mean for Behavioral Health, MENTAL HEALTHCARE REF. (Dec. 22, 2011), 
http://mentalhealthcarereform.org/essential-health-benefits-what-does-the-new-hhs-guidance-mean-
for-behavioral-health/. 
27 EHB BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 8. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 12. 
30 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 163 (2010), codified at 42 U.S.C.A 
§ 18022 (West 2012). 
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sub-provision codified at section 1302(b)(1)(E) of ACA (the “Mental Health Benefit 
Sub-Provision”).31 Thus far, HHS understandably has focused on the ten ACA-
required benefit categories as a whole and not just the Mental Health Benefit Sub-
Provision.32 In its Workshop Report, the Committee explained that “time constraints 
prohibited the [C]ommittee from hearing testimony related to each of the[] [ten 
ACA-required] categories in detail.”33 The scant attention received by mental health 
and substance use disorder benefits from HHS likely is a result of the time 
constraints faced by the Committee. Notwithstanding, the result is a tentative HHS 
plan that is timid with respect to the comprehensiveness and specificity of all 
benefits, including mental and substance use disorder benefits. This Article urges 
HHS to consider the possibility of long-term total healthcare cost returns on initial 
comprehensive mental health treatment investments. This Article also seeks to 
remedy the informational and research limitations in HHS’s initial implementation 
of the EHB Provision. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II examines the historically inferior public 
and private health insurance benefits available to individuals with illnesses 
traditionally classified as mental. Part III reviews the development, application, and 
limitations of relevant federal mental health insurance laws, recommendations, and 
proposals, including the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, the Paul Wellstone and 
Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010, the Workshop Report issued on August 29, 2011, the 
Consensus Report issued on October 7, 2011, and the EHB Bulletin issued on 
December 16, 2011. Part IV examines the current health plan cost literature that 
supports mental health parity and comprehensive mental health and substance use 
disorder benefits. Part IV also justifies and proposes the adoption of a 
comprehensive and specific essential mental health and substance use disorder 
services benefit. 
II. HISTORICALLY INFERIOR INSURANCE BENEFITS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
WITH MENTAL ILLNESS34 
A. INFERIOR PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAM BENEFITS 
Public healthcare programs and private health insurers have long provided less 
comprehensive insurance benefits to individuals with mental illness in both the 
inpatient35 and outpatient36 settings.37 The Medicare program, a public healthcare 
                                                           
31 Id. § 1302(b)(1)(E). 
32 See infra notes 153, 228-32 and accompanying text.  
33 WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 10, at 71. 
34 Part II of this Article is reprinted with updates and minor changes with permission from 
Tovino, supra note 2, at pt. 1. 
35 An inpatient may be defined as a patient who: (1) receives room, board, and professional 
services in a medical institution for a twenty-four-hour period or longer; or (2) is expected by the 
institution to receive room, board, and professional services in the institution for a twenty-four-hour 
period or longer even though it later develops that the patient dies, is discharged, or is transferred to 
another facility and does not actually stay in the institution for twenty-four hours. See 42 C.F.R. 
§ 440.2(a) (2010). 
36 An outpatient may be defined as a patient of an organized medical facility, or distinct part of 
that facility, who is expected by the facility to receive and who does receive professional services for 
less than a twenty-four-hour period regardless of the hour of admission, whether a bed is used, and 
whether the patient remains in the facility past midnight. See id. 
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program funded and administered by the U.S. government, provides health insurance 
for individuals who are sixty-five years of age or older, individuals under the age of 
sixty-five who have certain disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease 
regardless of age.38 Both Medicare Part A, which provides hospital insurance 
benefits,39 and Medicare Part B, which provides physician and other supplementary 
medical insurance benefits,40 provide less comprehensive insurance benefits for 
beneficiaries with mental illness. 
Medicare Part A restricts beneficiaries to a lifetime maximum of 190 inpatient 
days in a free-standing psychiatric hospital but places no lifetime maximum on the 
number of days a beneficiary may stay as an inpatient in a non-psychiatric hospital.41 
The federal government justifies the 190-day limitation as a cost-control measure.42 
Some Medicare beneficiaries with severe chronic mental illnesses, including chronic 
schizophrenia and affective disorders, would easily exceed 190 inpatient days over 
their lifetime without the limitation.43 With the limitation, affected beneficiaries are 
limited to: (1) Medicare-covered outpatient mental healthcare, which may be 
insufficiently intense to treat an acute illness episode and may result in suicide or 
other poor outcomes; (2) Medicare-covered inpatient care provided in a non-
psychiatric setting by clinicians who may lack the education, training, and 
experience necessary to treat complex psychiatric conditions; or (3) non-covered 
inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting for which the beneficiary must pay 
entirely out of pocket.44 Some beneficiaries who consider unsatisfactory the options 
                                                                                                                                            
37 See, e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 418 (1999) [hereinafter SURGEON 
GENERAL REPORT] (“Private health insurance is generally more restrictive in coverage of mental 
illness than in coverage for somatic illness.”). Id. (“Federal public financing mechanisms, such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, also imposed limitations on coverage . . . of ‘nervous and mental 
disease’ . . . .”); Colleen L. Barry, The Political Evolution of Mental Health Parity, 14 HARV. REV. 
PSYCHIATRY 185, 186 (2006) [hereinafter Barry, Political Evolution] (“Ever since the inception of 
third-party payment for mental health services, coverage has been substantially more limited than 
insurance for general medical care.”). 
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2006). See generally CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CMS PRODUCT NO. 11306, WHAT IS MEDICARE? (2011). 
39 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c–1395i-5 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (establishing “[Medicare] Part A—
Hospital Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”). 
40 See id. §§ 1395j–1395w-4 (establishing “[Medicare] Part B—Supplementary Medical 
Insurance Benefits for Aged and Disabled”). 
41 See 42 C.F.R. § 409.62 (2010); see also NAT’L POLICY FORUM, MEDICARE’S MENTAL HEALTH 
BENEFITS 1 (2007); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO STAFF MEMORANDUM: THE INPATIENT 
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL BENEFIT UNDER MEDICARE 4-5 (1993) [hereinafter CBO MEMORANDUM].  
42 See Judith R. Lave & Howard H. Goldman, Medicare Financing for Mental Health Care, 9 
HEALTH AFF. 19, 21 (1990) (“This limit assures that Medicare will not pay for the long-term custodial 
support of the mentally ill.”); NAT’L POLICY FORUM, supra note 41, at 10 (explaining that Medicare 
Part A’s 190-day lifetime maximum on mental healthcare provided in a free-standing psychiatric 
hospital was intended to limit the federal government’s mental healthcare costs). 
43 See, e.g., Letter from Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Alliance on Mental Illness, to 
Rep. Paul Tonko (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section= 
Issue_Spotlights&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=107512 
(explaining that many non-elderly Medicare beneficiaries with disabilities have already exceeded the 
190-day limit or are at imminent risk of doing so). 
44 CBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13 (noting that once a Medicare beneficiary reaches the 
190-day limitation, the beneficiary may turn for care to a general hospital (where the limit does not 
apply) or to outpatient care, or may forgo psychiatric care entirely); id. at 10 (“[T]he alternative 
provider might be less capable of providing the most appropriate care if psychiatric hospitals have 
specialized in treating certain kinds of patients—for example, those who need acute care for severe or 
complex conditions.”); CAL. HEALTH ADVOCATES, SUMMARY OF MEDICARE BENEFITS AND COST 
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of outpatient mental healthcare or inpatient care in a non-psychiatric setting may 
forgo mental healthcare entirely if they are unable to pay 100 percent of the costs of 
inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting.45  
In addition to the Medicare Part A limitation on inpatient care provided in a 
free-standing psychiatric hospital, Medicare Part B also provides less comprehensive 
outpatient mental health benefits than non-mental health benefits.46 In particular, 
Medicare Part B currently imposes a forty percent beneficiary co-insurance47 on 
most outpatient mental health services, including individual, family, and group 
psychotherapy services, instead of the twenty percent beneficiary co-insurance 
traditionally applied to non-mental health outpatient services.48 Although Medicare 
will phase out the disparate co-insurances by the year 2014, Medicare beneficiaries 
who receive outpatient mental health services between the present and 2014 will be 
required to pay more out of pocket for outpatient mental health services compared to 
outpatient physical health services.49 
The Medicaid Program, a public healthcare program jointly funded by the 
federal and state governments and administered by the states, provides healthcare to 
certain low-income individuals and families who fit into an eligibility group 
recognized by federal and state law.50 Like the Medicare Program, the Medicaid 
Program also has limited support for individuals who require mental healthcare in 
certain inpatient psychiatric settings. For example, Medicaid does not cover inpatient 
mental healthcare provided to individuals age twenty-two through sixty-four in an 
                                                                                                                                            
SHARING FOR 2011 (2010), available at http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/basics/benefits-
summary.html (explaining that Medicare beneficiaries pay out of pocket for 100% of the costs of 
inpatient services provided in a psychiatric setting after 190 days). 
45 CBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13 (“[E]nrollees who consider alternative sources of 
covered care to be unsatisfactory substitutes may forgo care entirely, either because they are unable to 
pay for psychiatric hospital care themselves or because they choose not to do so.”). 
46 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDIGAP COVERAGE OF OUTPATIENT MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES THAT ARE SUBJECT TO THE 
MENTAL HEALTH PAYMENT REDUCTION 3 (2002) [hereinafter MEDIGAP COVERAGE]. 
47 Although no health insurance-related federal statute or regulation defines “co-insurance,” it 
may be defined as the insured’s liability after the insurer has paid its portion of the total healthcare 
costs. See id. at 2, 6 n.ix (defining co-insurance without reference to a statute or regulation and with 
respect to common parlance; that is, the beneficiary’s liability after Medicare payment is made). 
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (calculating as Medicare-incurred expenses 
only 62.5% of the outpatient expenses associated with the treatment of mental, psychoneurotic, and 
personality disorders). Until 2010, Medicare was thus responsible for only 50% (i.e., 62.5% x 80% 
(80% is the Medicare approved amount)) of the cost of most outpatient mental health services, and the 
Medicare beneficiary was responsible for the remaining 50%. In 2008, President George W. Bush 
signed into law the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, section 102 of 
which increased Medicare’s portion of incurred expenses for outpatient mental health services to 
68.75% in 2010 and 2011 (resulting in a 45% beneficiary co-insurance in those years), 75% in 2012 
(resulting in a 40% beneficiary co-insurance), 81.25% in 2013 (resulting in a 35% beneficiary co-
insurance), and 100% in 2014 and thereafter (resulting in a 20% co-insurance). By 2014, Medicare 
thus will pay 80% of (and Medicare beneficiaries will pay a 20% co-insurance on) all outpatient 
mental health services. Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-275, § 102, 122 Stat. 2494, 2498 (“Elimination of Discriminatory Copayment Rates for Medicare 
Outpatient Psychiatric Services.”). 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(c). 
50 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36-37 (1981) (“An individual is entitled to 
Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the state in which he lives.”); Overview Medicaid 
Program—General Information, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/medicaidgeninfo/01_overview.asp? (last updated Nov. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Medicaid Program]. 
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institution for mental disease (IMD),51 defined as a hospital, nursing facility, or other 
institution of more than sixteen beds that is primarily engaged in providing 
diagnosis, treatment, or care of persons with mental disease.52 Medicaid also does 
not cover mental healthcare provided in small residential facilities, including 
halfway houses, adult residential foster homes, and crisis centers.53 Due to these 
limitations, many Medicaid beneficiaries are limited to: (1) Medicaid-covered 
outpatient mental healthcare, which may be insufficiently intense to treat an acute 
illness episode and may result in suicide or other poor outcomes; (2) Medicaid-
covered inpatient care provided in a facility other than an IMD or a small residential 
facility by clinicians who may lack the education, training, and experience necessary 
to treat complex psychiatric conditions; or (3) non-covered inpatient care provided 
in an IMD or small residential facility for which the beneficiary must pay entirely 
out of pocket.54 Because Medicaid eligibility generally requires evidence of low 
income,55 most Medicaid beneficiaries will not be able to pay 100% of the cost of 
treatment in an IMD or small residential facility.56 
B. INFERIOR PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE BENEFITS 
Private health insurers also have a long history of providing less comprehensive 
insurance benefits to individuals with mental illness.57 Traditionally, many private 
insurers did not cover mental illness.58 Notwithstanding the efforts of mental health 
parity advocates,59 neither the Federal Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (MHPA)60 
                                                           
51 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.1009(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting Medicaid coverage of healthcare services 
provided to individuals under age sixty-five who are patients in an institution for mental disease). 
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(i) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining institution for mental disease). 
53 See, e.g., Carl A. Taube, Howard H. Goldman & David Salkever, Medicaid Coverage for 
Mental Illness: Balancing Access and Costs, 9 HEALTH AFF. 5, 8 (1990). 
54 See generally MEDIGAP COVERAGE, supra note 46 passim. 
55 See, e.g., Medicaid Program, supra note 50.  
56 Costs of inpatient care provided in a psychiatric setting can exceed $1000 per day in a public 
facility and $2000 per day in a private facility. See, e.g., Meg Kissinger, Mental Facility’s Size Cost 
Taxpayers Million, MILWAUKEE WIS. J. SENTINEL (Nov. 13, 2010), http://www.jsonline.com/ 
watchdog/watchdogreports/107835219.html (stating that the cost of inpatient care at Milwaukee 
County Mental Health Complex, a public psychiatric hospital located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is 
$1082 per day); $58,752 for 18 Days of Involuntary Commitment to Mental Hospital, BIPOLAR: 
CRAZY MERMAID’S BLOG (Aug. 14, 2010), http://crazymer1.wordpress.com/ 2010/08/14/58752-for-
18-days-of-involuntary-committment-to-mental-hospital/ (stating that the cost of inpatient care at 
Fairfax Hospital, a private psychiatric hospital located in Kirkland, Washington, is between $2468 and 
$3900 per day). 
57 See, e.g., Colleen L. Barry et al., Design of Mental Health Benefits: Still Unequal After All 
These Years, 22 HEALTH AFF. 127, 127 (2003) [hereinafter Barry et al., Still Unequal] (presenting 
health insurance data from a national employer survey; finding that, even after the implementation of 
the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, private employer-sponsored mental health insurance coverage is 
less comprehensive than non-mental health insurance coverage). 
58 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 418 (“Some private insurers refused to cover 
mental illness treatment . . . .”).  
59 Mental health parity advocates support the financing of mental healthcare on the same basis as 
the financing of physical healthcare. See, e.g., id. at 426 (describing the concept of mental health 
parity and explaining that “[t]he fundamental motivation behind parity legislation is the desire to 
cover mental illness on the same basis as somatic illness, that is, to cover mental illness fairly”). See 
generally Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s Mental Health Dilemma? Current 
State Legislative Schemes Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 325, 328 
(2005) (describing the mental health parity movement).  
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nor the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction 
Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA)61 discussed in Parts III.A and III.B, infra, required 
private insurers to offer insurance benefits for mental illness.62 Before President 
Obama signed ACA into law and unless otherwise prohibited by state law, private 
health insurers were permitted to sell individual policies and group health plans that 
contained benefits for illnesses traditionally classified as physical, such as cancer 
and pregnancy, but that did not contain benefits for illnesses traditionally classified 
as mental, including major depression and bipolar disorder.63 Under ACA, mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits must be part of the EHB Package offered 
in the exchange-offered qualified health plan setting,64 the non-exchange individual 
health plan setting, the non-exchange small group health plan setting, the Medicaid 
benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plan setting, and the state basic health plan 
setting.65 However, as discussed in more detail in Part III.C, infra, the EHB Package 
is not required to be provided by grandfathered health plans, large group health plans 
(at least until 2017, when ACA permits the exchanges to open to large employers), 
self-insured group health plans, or traditional Medicaid.66 Even after the full 
implementation of healthcare reform, then, millions of insureds still will not have a 
federal legal right to a mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefit.67 
Prior to ACA, some health plans voluntarily included insurance benefits for 
mental illness; however, many of these plans imposed higher cost-sharing 
requirements and greater administrative restrictions on mental health coverage, 
including higher deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance amounts for mental 
healthcare, as well as lower inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations and annual 
and lifetime spending caps for mental healthcare.68 Although MHPAEA requires 
                                                                                                                                            
60 Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)). 
61 Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 
Stat. 3881 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26). 
62 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring a group 
health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any 
mental health benefits.”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(b)(1). 
63 See 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26(b)(1). Some states do require individual 
and group health plans to include mental health benefits in their health plans. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 
§ 27-54-4(a)(1) to (8) (2010) (requiring all group health plans to include insurance benefits for a range 
of mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorders, and mood disorders); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 431M-2 (2010) (requiring all individual and group health plans to include insurance benefits for 
mental illness as well as alcohol and drug dependency).  
64 A health insurance exchange is a competitive insurance marketplace where individuals and 
small businesses can purchase affordable and qualified health benefit plans beginning on or after 
January 1, 2014. See Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, by Year, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/law/timeline/full.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). Exchange-offered health 
plans must include the EHB Package, defined to include mental health and substance use disorder 
benefits, by the same date. See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1)(E), 124 Stat. 119 (2010), 
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022 (West 2012); Essential Health Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/e/essential.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
65 See EHB BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 1 (listing the health plan settings that must comply with 
ACA’s essential health benefits requirement); CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 17, at 6 box S-1, 18. 
66 See CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 17, at 18-20. 
67 See infra Part III.C. 
68 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 426-27 (summarizing typical mental 
health benefit disparities that existed in 1997: “the most common insurance restriction was an annual 
limit on inpatient days . . . ”); Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 37, at 186 (“In 1982, 31% of full-
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parity between physical health benefits and mental health benefits in terms of 
deductibles, co-payments, co-insurance, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient 
visit limitations,69 as discussed below in Part III.B, MHPAEA initially regulated 
only large group health plans, not small group health plans.70 As enacted, MHPAEA 
also did not apply to individual health insurance policies sold in the private market, 
the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed care plans, or any self-funded non-
federal governmental group plan whose sponsor has opted out of MHPAEA.71 
Before ACA and unless otherwise prohibited by state law, many public healthcare 
programs and private health plans thus were permitted to contain disparate mental 
health benefits.72 Although ACA broadened the application of MHPA, as expanded 
by MHPAEA, from just the large group health plan setting to the exchange-offered 
qualified health plan setting and the Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent 
plan setting,73 some non-exchange plans continue to be exempt from MHPA as 
expanded by MHPAEA and ACA (collectively, “federal mental health parity law”). 
The Medicare Program and traditional fee-for-service Medicaid also continue to be 
exempt from federal mental health parity law, as are self-funded, non-federal 
governmental plans whose sponsors have opted out of federal mental health parity 
law.74 Even after the full implementation of healthcare reform, then, many public 
healthcare program beneficiaries and some individuals with private health insurance 
still will not have a federal legal right to equal physical health and mental health 
insurance benefits.75 
                                                                                                                                            
time employees with mental health benefits in medium and large private firms were subject to separate 
inpatient day limits, and 19% had separate outpatient visit limits. By 2002, 77% had separate inpatient 
day limits, and 75% had separate outpatient visit limits . . . .”); Kaplan, supra note 59, at 329 
(summarizing mental health benefit disparities that existed in the context of employer-sponsored 
health plans in 1988); Keith Nelson, Legislative and Judicial Solutions for Mental Health Parity: S. 
543, Reasonable Accommodation, and an Individualized Remedy Under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM. U. 
L. REV. 91, 93, 99 (2001) (discussing typical private plan limitations on mental health insurance 
benefits).  
69 See infra Part III.B. 
70 See infra Part III.B.  
71 See infra Part III.B. 
72 Some states do require small group health plans and individual health insurance policies to 
establish parity between physical and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, co-payments, co-
insurance, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient visit limitations. See, e.g., 24 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
24, § 2325-A(5-C)(B)(1) (2010) (requiring health insurance policies issued in Maine to provide 
insurance benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness under terms and conditions that 
are no less extensive than the benefits provided for treatment of physical illness); id. § 2325-A(5-
C)(B)(4) (prohibiting health insurance policies issued in Maine from containing separate maximums 
for physical and mental illness, separate deductibles and co-insurance amounts for physical illness and 
mental illness, separate out-of-pocket limits for physical illness and mental illness, or separate office 
visit limits for physical illness and mental illness); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-802(c) (West 2012) 
(requiring individual and group health insurance policies issued in Maryland to provide benefits for 
the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness under the same terms and conditions that apply under the 
policy or contract for the diagnosis and treatment of physical illness).  
73 See infra Part III.C. 
74 See infra Parts III.A-C.  
75 See infra Parts III.A-C. 
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III. FEDERAL MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND MANDATORY MENTAL 
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS: LAWS, 
RECOMMENDATIONS, AND PROPOSALS76 
A. THE MENTAL HEALTH PARITY ACT OF 1996 
In an attempt to remedy some of the historically inferior health insurance 
benefits available to individuals with mental illness, the federal government took its 
first step towards establishing mental health parity on September 26, 1996, when 
President Bill Clinton signed the Federal Mental Health Parity Act into law.77 In 
terms of application, MHPA was very limited. As originally enacted, the statute only 
regulated insured and self-insured group health plans of large employers, defined as 
those employers that employ an average of fifty-one or more employees.78 MHPA 
thus did not apply to the group health plans of small employers.79 MHPA also did 
not apply to individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid non-managed 
care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plan whose sponsor opted 
out of MHPA.80 Finally, MHPA contained an “increased cost” exemption for 
covered group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with 
such plans if the application of MHPA resulted in an increase in the cost under the 
                                                           
76 Parts III.A-C of this Article are reprinted with updates and minor changes with permission 
from Tovino, supra note 2, at pts. II.A-C. Parts III.D-E of this Article are new. 
77 See MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 110 Stat. 2944 (1996). 
78 See id. § 712(a)(1), (2) (applying in each case to “a group health plan (or health insurance 
coverage offered in connection with such a plan . . . )”). 
79 See id. § 712(c)(1)(A)-(B) (exempting from MHPA application group health plans of small 
employers; defining small employers as those who employed an average of at least two but not more 
than fifty employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least 
two employees on the first day of the plan year). 
80 See, e.g., The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, CTRS. FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. 
OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (last visited April 3, 2010) [hereinafter The 
Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act] (“MHPAEA does not apply to small group health 
plans.”); id. (“Medicare Medicaid are not issuers of health insurance. They are public health plans 
through which individuals obtain health coverage. . . . Medicaid Benchmark Benefit plans [however] . . . 
are subject to certain requirements of MHPAEA.”); id. (“Non-Federal governmental employers that 
provide self-funded group health plan coverage to their employees (coverage that is not provided through 
an insurer) may elect to exempt their plan (opt-out) from the requirements of MHPAEA . . . .”); Colleen 
L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction Insurance Parity, 88 
MILBANK Q. 404, 407 (2010) [hereinafter Barry et al., Political History] (explaining that the MHPAEA 
applies to Medicare Advantage coverage offered through a group health plan, Medicaid managed care, 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program, and state and local government plans, but not Medicaid 
non-managed care plans); Letter from Cindy Mann, Dir. of the Ctr. for Medicaid and CHIP Servs. 
(CMCS), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State Health 
Officials 2 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at https://www.cms.gov/SMDL/downloads/SHO110409.pdf (“The 
MHPAEA requirements apply to Medicaid only insofar as a State’s Medicaid agency contracts with one 
or more managed care organizations (MCOs) or Prepaid Inpatient Health Plans (PIHPs), to provide 
medical/surgical benefits as well as mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . . MHPAEA 
parity requirements do not apply to the Medicaid State plan if a State does not use MCOs or PIHPs to 
provide these benefits.”); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-21(a)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (permitting sponsors 
of self-insured non-federal governmental health plans to opt out of particular federal requirements); 45 
C.F.R. § 146.180(a)(1)(v) (2011) (permitting sponsors of self-insured non-federal governmental health 
plans to opt out of federal mental health parity requirements); Memorandum from Steve Larsen, Dir. of 
Oversight, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 2 (Sept. 21, 2010) (discussing the ability of self-funded, 
non-federal governmental plans to opt out of federal mental health parity law and the survival of such 
ability post-ACA: “[p]rovisions subject to opt-out for plan years beginning on or after 9/23/10 
[include] . . . [p]arity in the application of certain limits to mental health benefits (including requirements 
of the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act)”).  
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plan of at least one percent.81 By November 1998, over two years following 
MHPA’s enactment, only four plans across the United States had obtained 
exemptions due to cost increases of one percent or more.82 
In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPA was neither a mandated offer nor a 
mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in MHPA required a covered large group 
health plan to actually offer or provide any mental health benefits.83 As originally 
enacted, MHPA also was not a comprehensive parity law because it neither 
protected individuals with substance use disorders84 nor required parity between 
physical and mental health benefits in terms of deductibles, co-payments, co-
insurance, inpatient day limitations, or outpatient visit limitations.85 
As originally enacted, what MHPA did do was regulate lifetime and annual 
spending limits that covered group health plans applied to mental health benefits if 
such plans already offered both physical and mental health benefits.86 More 
specifically, if a covered group health plan did not impose an aggregate lifetime or 
annual limit on substantially all physical health benefits, the plan was prohibited 
from imposing an aggregate lifetime or annual limit on offered mental health 
benefits.87 If a covered group health plan did impose an aggregate lifetime or annual 
limit on substantially all physical health benefits, the plan was required to apply the 
applicable limit to both physical health and mental health benefits and not 
distinguish in the application of such limit between the two benefit sets; or, the plan 
was prohibited from imposing any aggregate lifetime or annual limit on mental 
health benefits that was less than the applicable lifetime or annual limit imposed on 
physical health benefits.88 MHPA (and, as discussed in Part III.C, infra, ACA) thus 
would prohibit a covered group health plan from imposing a $20,000 annual cap or a 
$100,000 lifetime cap on mental healthcare if the plan had no annual or lifetime caps 
for physical healthcare or if the plan had higher caps, such as a $50,000 annual cap 
or a $500,000 lifetime cap, for physical healthcare. 
B. THE PAUL WELLSTONE AND PETE DOMENICI MENTAL HEALTH PARITY AND 
ADDICTION EQUITY ACT OF 2008 
Twelve years after President Clinton signed MHPA into law, President George 
W. Bush expanded federal mental health parity law by signing into law the Paul 
Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 
2008.89 In terms of application, MHPAEA also was very limited. As originally 
                                                           
81 MHPA, Pub. L. No. 104-204, § 712(c)(2), 110 Stat. 2944 (1996). 
82 Barry et al., Political Evolution, supra note 37, at 187.  
83 See MHPA § 712(b)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring a group health 
plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection with such a plan) to provide any mental 
health benefits . . . . ”). 
84 See id. § 712(e)(4) (“The term ‘mental health benefits’ means benefits with respect to mental 
health services, as defined under the terms of the plan or coverage (as the case may be), but does not 
include benefits with respect to treatment of substance abuse or chemical dependency.”). 
85 See id. § 712(b)(2) (“Nothing in this Section shall be construed . . . as affecting the terms and 
conditions (including cost sharing, limits on numbers of visits or days of coverage, and requirements 
relating to medical necessity) relating to the amount, duration, or scope of mental health benefits 
under the plan or coverage . . . .”). 
86 See id. § 712(a)(1)-(2). 
87 See id. § 712(a)(1)(A) (no aggregate lifetime limits); id. § 712(a)(2)(A) (no annual limits). 
88 See id. § 712(a)(1)(B) (aggregate lifetime limits); id. § 712(a)(2)(B) (annual limits).  
89 See MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
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enacted, MHPAEA (like MHPA) only regulated insured and self-insured group 
health plans of large employers, defined as those employers that employ an average 
of fifty-one or more employees.90 MHPAEA (like MHPA) thus did not apply to 
small group health plans, individual health plans, the Medicare Program, Medicaid 
non-managed care plans, or any self-funded, non-federal governmental plans whose 
sponsor opted out of MHPAEA.91 In terms of its substantive provisions, MHPAEA 
also was neither a mandated offer nor a mandated benefit law; that is, nothing in 
MHPAEA required a covered group health plan to actually offer or provide any 
mental health benefits.92 Like MHPA, MHPAEA also contained an “increased cost” 
exemption for covered group health plans and health insurance coverage offered in 
connection with such plans, but under MHPAEA the amount of the required cost 
increase increased, at least for the first year.93 That is, a covered plan that could 
demonstrate a cost increase of at least two percent in the first plan year and one 
percent in each subsequent plan year of the actual total costs of coverage with 
respect to medical and surgical benefits and mental health and substance use 
disorder benefits would be eligible for an exemption from MHPAEA for such year.94 
MHPAEA required determinations of exemption-qualifying cost increases to be 
made and certified in writing by a qualified and licensed actuary who in good 
standing belongs to the American Academy of Actuaries.95 
Notwithstanding these limitations and exemptions, MHPAEA built on MHPA 
by protecting individuals with substance use disorders96 and by imposing 
comprehensive parity requirements on covered group health plans. In particular, 
MHPAEA required financial requirements (including deductibles, co-payments, co-
insurance, and other out-of-pocket expenses)97 and treatment limitations (including 
inpatient day and outpatient visit limitations)98 that covered group health plans 
imposed on mental health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more 
restrictive than the predominant financial requirements and treatment limitations 
imposed on substantially all physical health benefits.99 MHPAEA thus prohibited 
covered group health plans from imposing higher deductibles, co-payments, or co-
                                                           
90 Id. § 512(a)(1) (applying only to group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in 
connection with such plans). 
91 See supra note 80. 
92 See MHPAEA § 512(a)(1) (regulating only those group health plans that offer both physical 
health and mental health benefits); The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act, supra note 80 
(stating, “MHPAEA does not require large group health plans and their health insurance issuers to 
cover MH/SUD [mental health and substance use disorder] benefits. The law’s requirements apply 
only to large group health plans and their health insurance issuers that choose to include MH/SUD 
benefits in their benefit packages.”). 
93 See MHPAEA § 512(a)(3) (establishing new cost exemption provisions).  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. § 512(a)(4) (adding a new definition of “substance use disorder benefits”); id. 
§ 512(a)(1) (regulating the financial requirements and treatment limitations that are applied to both 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits). 
97 See id. § 512(a)(1) (including within the definition of “financial requirements” deductibles, co-
payments, co-insurance, and out-of-pocket expenses).  
98 See id. (including within the definition of “treatment limitations” limits on the frequency of 
treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and other similar limits on the scope or duration of 
treatment). 
99 See id. (requiring both financial requirements and treatment limitations applicable to mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits to be no more restrictive than the predominant financial 
requirements and treatment limitations applied to substantially all physical health benefits covered by 
the plan). 
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insurances, or lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, on individuals 
who were seeking care for conditions—such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, 
alcohol abuse, and drug abuse—compared to individuals who were seeking care for 
traditional physical conditions—such as pregnancy, cancer, and orthopedic injuries. 
On February 2, 2010, the Departments of Treasury, Labor, and HHS co-released an 
interim final rule implementing MHPAEA’s requirements.100 The interim final rule 
clarified in favor of patients with mental health conditions several questions that 
MHPA and MHPAEA had left open, including the question whether a covered group 
health plan could impose separately accumulating financial requirements or 
quantitative treatment limitations on mental health and substance use disorder 
benefits (“No”),101 and the question whether a covered group health plan could 
impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation (including a medical necessity 
limitation or an experimental/investigative limitation) on mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits (also “No”).102  
C. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 
Before healthcare reform, mental health insurance benefits thus were regulated 
by MHPA as expanded by MHPAEA as well as by more stringent state law.103 In 
March 2010, President Obama further expanded mental health parity and mental 
health and substance use disorder benefit law by signing ACA into law.104 Best 
known for its controversial (and constitutionally challenged) individual health 
insurance mandate,105 ACA has buried within it several provisions that relate to 
mental health parity and mandatory mental health and substance use disorder 
benefits. If upheld,106 these provisions will extend mental health parity law and 
create a mandatory mental health and substance use disorder services requirement in 
a way that will benefit additional (but not all) groups of individuals with public and 
private health insurance. 
The first ACA provision that is relevant to mental health parity law provides: 
“Section 2726 of the Public Health Service Act [PHSA] shall apply to qualified 
health plans in the same manner and to the same extent as such section applies to 
                                                           
100 Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and 
Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5410-51 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
101 See id. at 5449 (revising 45 C.F.R. § 46.136(c)(3)(v) to clarify that covered group health plans 
may not apply cumulative financial requirements or cumulative quantitative treatment limitations for 
mental health or substance use disorder benefits in a classification that accumulates separately from 
any established for medical or surgical benefits in the same classification). 
102 See id. (revising 45 C.F.R. § 46.136(c)(4)(i) and (ii) to clarify that a covered group health 
plan may not impose a non-quantitative treatment limitation on mental health and substance use 
disorder benefits unless the processes used in applying the treatment limitation are comparable to, and 
are applied no more stringently than, the processes used in applying the same limitation on medical 
and surgical benefits). 
103 See Tovino, supra note 4, at pts. I.A-I.D (describing the patchwork of state mental health 
parity law and providing examples of state laws that are more and less stringent than federal law). 
104 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
105 Id. § 1501(a) (adding to the Internal Revenue Code: “[a]n applicable individual shall for each 
month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an 
applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month”).  
106 See, e.g., Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), 
cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011) (mem.), and cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-398) (mem.) (argued Mar. 26-27, 2012), and cert. granted in 
part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (No. 11-400) (mem.) (argued Mar. 28, 2012).  
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health insurance issuers and group health plans.”107 Section 2726 of the PHSA is the 
parallel citation to 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26, the section within the United States Code 
where the non-ERISA provisions of MHPA as amended by MHPAEA are 
codified.108 The dramatic effect of this provision is to expand the application of 
MHPA and MHPAEA from just large group health plans to all qualified health plans 
that are offered on one of the new ACA-created state or regional health insurance 
exchanges beginning on or after January 1, 2014.109 The second relevant ACA 
provision makes conforming and technical changes to PHSA section 2726 to clarify 
the expansion of MHPA and MHPAEA to individual health insurance coverage.110 
As a result of these two provisions, many individual and small group health plans 
that were previously exempt from MHPA and MHPAEA now are prohibited from 
offering inferior mental health insurance benefits, including through higher 
deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance rates, as well as lower inpatient day and 
outpatient visit limitations.  
A third relevant ACA provision prevents group health plans and health 
insurance issuers offering group or individual health insurance coverage from 
establishing any lifetime as well as certain annual limits on the dollar value of 
essential health benefits for any participant or beneficiary.111 Although ACA 
reserves the right of a group health plan or health insurance coverage to impose 
annual and lifetime per beneficiary limits on specific covered benefits that are not 
essential health benefits,112 mental health and substance use disorder benefits, 
                                                           
107 ACA § 1311(j) (entitled “Applicability of Mental Health Parity”). 
108 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-26 (West 2012) (entitled “Parity in Mental Health and Substance Use 
Disorder Benefits”). 
109 ACA § 1311(j) (“[MHPAEA] shall apply to qualified health plans in the same manner and to 
the same extent as such section applies to health insurance issuers and group health plans.”). Compare 
the former MHPAEA, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3881 (2008) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1185a (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (making its 
provisions applicable to “group health plans or health insurance coverage offered in connection with 
such a plan”), with the newly amended 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2010) (making its provisions applicable 
to a “group health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance”). 
110 ACA § 1563(c)(4) (identifying the conforming and technical changes that will be made to 
former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (current 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26)); Historical and Statutory Notes for 
former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (noting that former 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 was transferred to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300gg-26); see also EHB BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 12 (“The Affordable Care Act also 
specifically extends MHPAEA to the individual market.”).  
111 ACA § 10101 (adding new PHSA § 2711(a)). ACA prohibits lifetime dollar limits on essential 
benefits in any grandfathered or non-grandfathered health plan or insurance policy issued or renewed 
on or after September 23, 2010. Id. ACA restricts and phases out annual dollar limits that all 
grandfathered and non-grandfathered group health plans, as well as non-grandfathered individual 
health insurance plans issued after March 23, 2010, can place on essential benefits; that is, none of 
these plans can impose an annual dollar limit lower than: (i) $750,000 for a plan year or policy year 
starting on or after September 23, 2010, but before September 23, 2011; (ii) $1.25 million for a plan 
year or policy year starting on or after September 23, 2011, but before September 23, 2012; or (iii) $2 
million for a plan year or policy year starting on or after September 23, 2012, but before January 1, 
2014. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2711T. ACA prohibits annual limits on essential benefits beginning 
January 1, 2014. See ACA § 10101 (adding new PHSA § 2711(a)(2)) (“With respect to plan years 
beginning prior to January 1, 2014, a group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage may only establish a restricted annual limit on the dollar value of 
benefits for any participant or beneficiary with respect to the scope of benefits that are essential health 
benefits under section 1302(b) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as determined by the 
Secretary.”); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815–2711T (2010). See generally Lifetime & Annual Limits, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/features/costs/ limits/index.html (last visited Mar. 
3, 2012) (explaining the new lifetime and annual limit prohibitions and restrictions). 
112 ACA § 10101 (adding new PHSA § 2711(b)). 
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including behavioral health treatments, are considered essential health benefits113 
and thus are excepted from the right of reservation. This third ACA provision builds 
on the original MHPA, which allowed lifetime and annual limits but only so long as 
such limits that applied to treatment of mental health conditions were not lower than 
those that applied to treatment of physical health conditions.114 Now, ACA prohibits 
all lifetime as well as most annual limits.115 
Perhaps most importantly, a fourth set of ACA provisions mandates mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits in certain plan settings. Under section 
1201 of ACA, a health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in the 
individual or small group markets shall ensure that such coverage includes the EHB 
Package required by section 1302 of ACA.116 Under section 1301 of ACA, qualified 
health plans that will be offered on the new ACA-created health insurance 
exchanges also must provide the EHB Package required by section 1302 of ACA.117 
Under section 1331 of ACA, the optional state basic health plans118 also must 
provide the EHB Package required by section 1302 of ACA.119 Finally, under 
section 2001 of ACA, Medicaid benchmark plans and benchmark-equivalent plans 
also must provide the EHB Package required by section 1302 of ACA.120 Under the 
quadruple-referenced section 1302 of ACA, the EHB Package includes “mental 
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.”121 
Read together, these four ACA provisions are significant. Federal law for the first 
time is mandating mental health and substance use disorder benefits in certain plan 
settings; that is, the non-exchange individual health plan, the non-exchange small 
group health plan, the exchange-offered qualified health plan, the state basic health 
plan, and the Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plan settings.122 
Under regulations co-published by the Departments of Treasury, Labor, and 
HHS on June 17, 2010, the Departments clarified, however, that the essential health 
                                                           
113 ACA § 1302(b)(1)(E) (including mental health and substance use disorder services, including 
behavioral health treatment, within the definition of essential health benefits). 
114 See supra Part III.A. 
115 HEALTHCARE.GOV, supra note 111 (“The ban on lifetime dollar limits for most covered 
benefits applies to every health plan—whether you buy coverage for yourself or your family, or you 
receive coverage through your employer.”). 
116 ACA § 1201 (adding new PHSA § 2707(a), to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6(a)). 
117 Id. § 1301(a)(1)(B) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B)). 
118 Individuals eligible for state basic health plan coverage include individuals who are not 
eligible for Medicaid and whose household income falls between 133 and 200 percent of the federal 
poverty level for the family involved as well as low-income legal resident immigrants. Id. § 1331(e). 
119 Id. § 1331(a)(1) (requiring state basic health plans to provide “at least the essential health 
benefits described in section 1302(b) to eligible individuals in lieu of offering such individuals 
coverage through an Exchange”). 
120 Id. § 2001(c)(3) (adding new 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-7(b)(5)). 
121 Id. § 1302(b)(1)(E) (“[E]ssential health benefits . . . shall include . . . [m]ental health and 
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.”); Pamela S. Hyde, The 
Affordable Care Act and Mental Health: An Update, HEALTHCARE.GOV (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.healthcare.gov/blog/2010/08/mentalhealthupdate.html (“[I]n 2014, mental health and 
substance use disorder services will be part of the essential benefits package, a set of health care 
service categories that must be covered by certain plans, including all insurance policies that will be 
offered through the Exchanges, and Medicaid.”). 
122 See id.; see also EHB BULLETIN, supra note 24, at 1 (listing the health plan settings regulated 
by ACA’s EHB requirement); CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 17, at 7 box S-1, 18-23 (listing the 
health plan settings regulated by ACA’s EHB requirement); Essential Health Benefits, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/e/essential.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) 
(“Insurance policies must cover these [essential health] benefits in order to be certified and offered in 
Exchanges, and all Medicaid state plans must cover these services by 2014.”). 
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benefit requirement does not apply to grandfathered health plans.123 A grandfathered 
health plan is a group health plan or health insurance issuer that was in effect on 
March 23, 2010, the day President Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) into law.124 Non-grandfathered health plans include 
group health plans and health insurance issuers established after March 23, 2010, as 
well as originally grandfathered health plans that subsequently lose grandfathered 
status.125 Situations that will not cause a grandfathered plan to lose grandfathered 
status include: (i) the cessation of coverage by the plan of one or more or all of the 
individuals enrolled in the plan on March 23, 2010, so long as the plan has 
continuously covered someone since March 23, 2010; (ii) the enrollment of new 
family members in the plan after March 23, 2010, so long as the family members are 
dependents of an individual who was enrolled in the plan on March 23, 2010; (iii) 
the enrollment of newly hired employees and the enrollment of existing employees 
eligible for new enrollment after March 23, 2010;126 and (iv) entering into a new 
policy, certificate or contract of insurance (that is, changing insurance carriers) after 
March 23, 2010.127 Activities that will cause a grandfathered plan to lose 
                                                           
123 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status 
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
34538, 34562 (June 17, 2010) (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(a), which defines 
“grandfathered health plan coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or a health 
insurance issuer, in which an individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010”); id. at 34559 (explaining 
that section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act does not apply to grandfathered health plans); id. at 
34563 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1)) (“[T]he provisions of PHS Act sections . . . 
2707 . . . do not apply to grandfathered health plans.”); EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, APPLICATION OF THE NEW HEALTH REFORM PROVISIONS OF PART A OF TITLE XXVII OF THE 
PHS ACT TO GRANDFATHERED PLANS 1 (2010) (explaining that ACA’s essential benefit package 
requirement is not applicable to grandfathered plans). 
124 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status 
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
34562 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a), which defines “grandfathered health plan 
coverage” as “coverage provided by a group health plan, or a health insurance issuer, in which an 
individual was enrolled on March 23, 2010”). 
125 Id. at 34541 (defining grandfathered plans and identifying the ways in which grandfathered 
plans can lose grandfathered status, turning them into non-grandfathered plans). 
126 Id. at 34562-63 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a)(1)(i) (cessation of coverage by 
one or more or all insureds), 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(a)(4) (addition of new family members), and 
29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(b)(1) (addition of newly hired or newly enrolled employees)). See 
generally BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLANS 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA) 1 (2011), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41166_20110103.pdf (summarizing who is allowed coverage under a 
grandfathered health plan; explaining, “[c]urrent enrollees in grandfathered health plans are allowed 
to re-enroll in that plan, even if renewal occurs after date of enactment. Family members are allowed 
to enroll in the grandfathered plan, if such enrollment is permitted under the terms of the plan in effect 
on the date of enactment. For grandfathered group plans, new employees (and their families) may 
enroll in such plans”). 
127 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status 
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
34562 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2950.715-1251(a)(1)(ii) (“[I]f an employer or employee organization 
enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 . . . then that policy, 
certificate, or contract of insurance is not a grandfathered health plan with respect to the individuals in 
the group health plan.”)); 29 C.F.R. § 2950.715-1251(a)(1)(ii) (stating “if an employer or employee 
organization enters into a new policy, certificate, or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 . . . 
then that policy, certificate, or contract of insurance is not a grandfathered health plan with respect to 
the individuals in the group health plan”); 29 C.F.R. § 2950.715-1251(a)(1)(i) (stating “Subject to the 
limitation set forth in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, a group health plan (and any health 
insurance coverage offered in connection with the group health plan) does not cease to be a 
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grandfathered status include: (i) the elimination of all or substantially all benefits to 
diagnose or treat a particular condition; (ii) any increase in a percentage cost-sharing 
requirement; (iii) certain increases in fixed-amount cost-sharing requirements, 
including deductibles and out-of-pocket limits but not co-payments; (iv) certain 
increases in fixed-amount co-payments; (v) certain decreases in contribution rates by 
employers and employee organizations; and (vi) certain changes in annual limits.128 
The Department of Treasury predicts that forty-nine to eighty percent of small 
employer plans and thirty-four to sixty-four percent of large employer plans will 
relinquish grandfathered status by the end of 2013.129  
Understanding the distinction between grandfathered and non-grandfathered 
plans is the key to understanding the application of ACA’s health insurance reforms, 
including the EHB Provision. Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the vast 
majority of new insurance reforms required by ACA,130 including newly added 
section 2707 of the Public Health Service Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26, 
which requires health insurance issuers that offer health insurance coverage in the 
individual and small group markets to ensure that such coverage includes the EHB 
Package.131 The result (in terms of mandated benefits) is that grandfathered health 
plans are regulated only by MHPA and MHPAEA, neither of which contains a 
mandated mental health or substance use disorder benefit,132 as well as state law, 
which may or may not contain a mandated mental health and substance use disorder 
benefit.133 Grandfathered health plans are not the only health plans that are exempt 
                                                                                                                                            
grandfathered health plan merely because the plan (or its sponsor) enters into a new policy, certificate, 
or contract of insurance after March 23, 2010 (for example, a plan enters into a new contract with a 
new issuer or a new policy is issued with an existing insurer)”).  
128 Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status 
as a Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
34564-65 (adding new 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715–1251(g)(1) (listing the changes that will cause cessation 
of grandfathered status)). 
129 Id. at 34552.  
130 See, e.g., id. at 34540 (“[C]ertain group health plans and health insurance coverage existing as 
of March 23, 2010 . . . , are subject only to certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act.”); 
FERNANDEZ, supra note 126, at 1 (“Grandfathered health plans are exempt from the vast majority of 
new insurance reforms under PPACA.”). 
131 ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (amending section 2707(a) 
of the PHS Act and stating that “[a] health insurance issuer that offers health insurance coverage in 
the individual or small group market shall ensure that such coverage includes the essential health 
benefits package required under section 1302(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”); 
Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Coverage Relating to Status as a 
Grandfathered Health Plan Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
34559 (explaining that section 2707 of the PHS Act does not apply to grandfathered health plans); 29 
C.F.R. § 2590.715-1251(c)(1) (“[T]he provisions of PHS Act section[] . . . 2707 . . . do[es] not apply 
to grandfathered health plans.”)); EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 123 (explaining that ACA’s 
essential benefit package requirement does not apply to grandfathered plans); CONSENSUS REPORT, 
supra note 17, at 18 (explaining that ACA’s EHB requirement does not apply to grandfathered health 
plans). 
132 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a(b)(1) (West 2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be 
construed . . . as requiring a group health plan (or health insurance coverage offered in connection 
with such a plan) to provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . .”); 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300gg-26(b)(1) (West 2012) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed . . . as requiring a group 
health plan or a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health insurance coverage to 
provide any mental health or substance use disorder benefits . . . .”). 
133 See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 4, at pts. I.A-I.D (discussing different state approaches to 
mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits).  
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from the EHB requirement.134 The EHB requirement also does not apply in the large 
group health plan setting (at least until 2017, when ACA permits the exchanges to 
open to large employers), the self-insured group health plan setting, and the 
traditional Medicaid setting.135,136 
D. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE’S WORKSHOP AND CONSENSUS REPORTS OF 2011 
Section 1302 of ACA requires the Secretary to define the EHB Package.137 
Among other requirements, ACA further specifies that the Secretary shall: (1) ensure 
that the scope of the EHB Package is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a 
typical employer plan;138 (2) ensure that the EHB Package reflects an appropriate 
balance among the categories so that the benefits are not unduly weighted toward 
any category;139 (3) not make coverage decisions, determine reimbursement rates, 
establish incentive programs, or design benefits in ways that discriminate against 
individuals because of their age, disability, or expected length of life;140 (4) take into 
account the healthcare needs of diverse segments of the population, including 
women, children, persons with disabilities, and other groups;141 and (5) periodically 
review the EHB Package and provide a report to Congress and the public assessing 
whether the EHB needs to be modified or updated.142 
Following ACA’s enactment, HHS requested guidance from the IOM on the 
criteria and methods that should be used to determine and update the EHB 
Package.143 To assist the Secretary with her responsibilities under ACA, the IOM 
formed the Committee.144 The Committee was not charged with identifying the 
individual elements or the detailed provisions of the EHB Package; instead, the 
Committee was asked to develop a framework for considering an EHB Package that 
                                                           
134 CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 17, at 18. 
135 See id. at 18-20 (listing the health plan settings to which ACA’s EHB requirement does not 
apply); Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum & Katherine Hayes, The Essential Health Benefits 
Provisions of the Affordable Care Act: Implications for People with Disabilities, 3 COMMONWEALTH 
FUND 1, 3 (2011) (“The act exempts large-group health plans, as well as self-insured ERISA plans and 
ERISA-governed multiemployer welfare arrangements not subject to state insurance law, from the 
essential benefit requirements.”). 
136 According to data on currently marketed health plans, thirty-four percent of individual or 
family health plan enrollees do not have coverage for substance abuse services and eighteen percent of 
enrollees do not have coverage for other mental health services. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y 
FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Essential Health Benefits: 
Individual Market Coverage, ASPE ISSUE BRIEF (Dec. 16, 2011) [hereinafter ASPE ISSUE BRIEF], 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/IndividualMarket/ib.shtml. 
137 ACA § 1302(a)(1) (“In this title, the term ‘essential health benefits package’ means, with 
respect to any health plan, coverage that . . . provides for the essential health benefits defined by the 
Secretary . . . .”); id. § 1302(b)(1) (“[T]he Secretary shall define the essential health benefits . . . .”). 
138 Id. § 1302(b)(2)(A). The Secretary also is responsible for determining the scope of benefits 
provided by a typical employer plan. To inform her determination, the Secretary was required to take 
into account a report by the Department of Labor on the scope of benefits offered under employer-
sponsored insurance. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SELECTED MEDICAL BENEFITS: A REPORT FROM THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (2011). 
139 ACA § 1302(b)(4)(A). 
140 Id. § 1302(b)(4)(B). 
141 Id. § 1302(b)(4)(C). 
142 Id. § 1302(b)(4)(G). 
143 WORKSHOP REPORT, supra note 10. 
144 Id. at 2. 
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would be “logically cohesive, address statutory requirements, and serve HHS now 
and in the future.”145 
The Committee began its work by providing opportunities for the public to 
comment on the EHB Package through two different venues.146 First, the Committee 
requested public comment on ten different Web-distributed questions relating to the 
EHB Package.147 Second, the Committee invited a number of speakers to present 
their views regarding the EHB Package at public workshops held on January 13-14, 
2011, in Washington, D.C., and on March 2, 2011, in Costa Mesa, California.148 The 
invited speakers included experts from federal and state government, employers, 
insurers, healthcare providers, consumers, and healthcare researchers.149 On August 
29, 2011, the Committee released the Workshop Report, which summarized the 
speaker presentations from the D.C. and Costa Mesa workshops but did not contain 
the Committee’s own recommendations regarding the EHB Package.150 During the 
workshops, speaker discussion coalesced around several key topics including 
balancing the generosity of coverage with affordability, balancing specificity versus 
flexibility in terms of the EHB Package, evaluating existing state benefit mandates 
for inclusion into the EHB Package, and defining a typical employer plan.151 
Because many of the speaker comments—especially those relating to balancing the 
generosity of coverage with affordability and the desirability of specificity versus 
flexibility in terms of the EHB Package—are relevant to the analysis and proposal 
set forth in Part IV of this Article, relevant speaker comments are briefly 
summarized in Part IV. 
On October 7, 2011, the Committee released the Consensus Report.152 In the 
Consensus Report, the Committee concluded that the Secretary should begin simply 
by defining the EHB Package to reflect the scope and design of packages offered by 
small employers, modified to include the ten ACA-required EHB categories.153 The 
Committee also identified criteria for the content of the aggregate EHB Package and 
specific components of the EHB Package,154 as well as four policy foundations (or 
domains) that HHS should use in determining the EHB Package, including 
economics, ethics, population-based health, and evidence-based practice.155 Like the 
speaker perspectives captured in the Workshop Report, perhaps the most important 
and recurring concern of the Committee that was expressed in the Consensus Report 
was the perceived tension between the need for comprehensive benefits and the 
concerns associated with the costs of such benefits.156 
                                                           
145 Id. at 17. 
146 Id. at 1-2. 
147 Id. For the list of questions, see id. at 161-62. 
148 Id. at 1-2. 
149 Id.  
150 Id. at 3. 
151 Id. at 2. 
152 CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 17. 
153 Id. at 1. 
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 See id. at xi (“If the package of benefits . . . is too broad, insurance might become too 
expensive.”); id. at 1 (“[T]he more expansive the benefit package is, the more it will likely cost and 
the less affordable it will be.”); id. (“The basic tension [i]s how comprehensive the EHB could be and 
still be affordable for consumers and payers and sustainable as a program over time.”); id. at 87 (“The 
central debate in constructing the EHB package has been balancing the comprehensiveness of benefits 
with their costs so as to promote value.”). 
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In the end, the Committee made five specific sets of recommendations.157 The 
Committee’s first major set of recommendations related to the establishment of the 
EHB Package.158 That is, by May 1, 2012, the Secretary should establish an EHB 
Package guided by a national average premium target.159 According to the 
Committee, the starting point in establishing the initial EHB Package should be the 
scope of benefits and design provided under a typical small employer plan in today’s 
market.160 To specify the initial EHB Package, the scope of benefits should then be 
modified to reflect the ten ACA-required benefit categories as well as additional 
criteria specified elsewhere in the Consensus Report for the content of both the 
aggregate EHB package and specific components of the EHB Package.161 
Importantly, the Committee recommended that section 1302(b)(1) of ACA, which 
states that “the essential health benefits . . . shall include at least the following 
general categories and the items and services covered within the categories,” not be 
read to mean that every service that is within one of the ten ACA-required categories 
or is covered by a typical employer plan should automatically be included within the 
EHB Package.162 
Once the Secretary has developed a preliminary EHB Package, the Committee 
recommends that the package be further adjusted so that the expected national 
average premium for a silver plan with the EHB Package is actuarially equivalent to 
the average premium that would have been paid by small employers in 2014 for a 
comparable population with a typical benefit design.163 The Committee finally 
recommended that the initial guidance provided by the Secretary on the contents of 
the EHB package should list standard benefit inclusions and exclusions at a level of 
specificity at least comparable to current best practice in the private and public 
insurance market.164 
The Committee’s second major recommendation was that, by January 1, 2013, 
the Secretary should establish a framework for obtaining and analyzing data 
necessary for monitoring implementation of and updating the EHB Package.165 
                                                           
157 For a discussion of the five recommendations, see id. at 90-149. 
158 Id. at 90. 
159 Id. 
160 Id.  
161 Id. For a list of the additional criteria relating to the content of the aggregate EHB package 
and specific components of the EHB package, see CONSENSUS REPORT, supra note 17, at 5 fig.S-2. 
The Committee recommended that, in the aggregate, the EHB Package be affordable, maximize the 
number of people with insurance coverage, protect the most vulnerable by addressing the particular 
needs of those patients and populations, encourage better care practices by promoting the right care to 
the right patient in the right setting at the right time, advance stewardship of resources by focusing on 
high value services and reducing use of low value services (with value being defined as outcomes 
relative to costs), address the medical concerns of greatest importance to enrollees in EHB-related 
plans, as identified through a public deliberative process, and protect against the greatest financial 
risks due to catastrophic events or illnesses. See id. at 5. The Committee recommended that individual 
services, devices, and drugs that are part of the EHB Package be safe (i.e., expected benefits should be 
greater than expected harms), be medically effective and supported by a sufficient evidence base (or, 
in the absence of evidence on effectiveness, a credible standard of care), demonstrate meaningful 
improvement in outcomes over current effective services and treatments, be a medical service (and not 
primarily a social or educational service), and be cost effective (such that the health gain for 
individual and population health is sufficient to justify the additional cost to taxpayers and 
consumers). Id. 
162 Id. at 63. 
163 Id. at 90. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 117. 
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According to the Committee, the framework should account for changes related to: 
(1) providers (including payment rates, contracting mechanisms, financial 
incentives, and scope and organization of practice); (2) patients and consumers 
(including demographics, health status, disease burden, and problems with access); 
and (3) health plans (including characteristics of plans such as inclusions, 
exclusions, and limitations, cost-sharing practices, patterns of enrollment and 
disenrollment, network configuration, medical management programs, value-based 
insurance design, and types of external appeals, risk selection, solvency, impact of 
ACA-mandated limits on deductibles, co-payments, and out-of-pocket spending on 
the ability of plans to offer acceptable products).166  
The Committee’s third major set of recommendations related to state 
innovation. As background, the health insurance reform provisions within ACA 
attempt to balance federal and state authority.167 While federal law regulates certain 
aspects of the individual and small group markets through various pricing and 
issuance requirements, states are given relatively broad authority to operate their 
own exchanges and to regulate other aspects of health insurance.168 Although ACA 
clearly states that the Secretary shall define the EHB Package, ACA does not 
address whether the Secretary is permitted to approve more than one EHB Package 
definition if the statutory requirements are otherwise satisfied.169 Because the 
Committee believes that the Secretary has the authority to approve refinements of 
the EHB Package definition, if she chooses to do so,170 the Committee’s third major 
set of recommendations relate to the EHB Package in terms of state innovation. 
Specifically, for states administering their own exchanges that wish to adopt a 
variant of the Federal EHB Package, the Committee recommended that the Secretary 
should use statutory authority to grant such requests, provided that: (1) the state-
specific EHB Package definition is consistent with the requirements of section 1302 
of the ACA and the Committee’s criteria relating to the aggregate and specific 
content of the EHB package; (2) the state definition produces a package that is 
actuarially equivalent to the national package established by the Secretary; and (3) 
each state’s variance request is supported by a process that has included meaningful 
public input.171 
The Committee’s fourth major set of recommendations related to updating the 
EHB Package. That is, the Secretary should, beginning in 2015 and annually 
thereafter, update the EHB Package with the goal of making the EHB Package more 
fully evidence-based, specific, and value-promoting.172 The Committee also 
recommended that the Secretary explicitly incorporate costs into updates to the EHB 
Package and obtain an actuarial estimate of the national average premium for a 
silver-level plan with the existing EHB Package in the next year.173 According to the 
Committee, the actuarial estimate should account for trends in medical prices, 
utilization, new technologies, and population characteristics.174 Finally, any changes 
to the EHB Package should not exceed the actuarially estimated cost of the current 
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169 Id.  
170 Id.  
171 Id. at 131-32. 
172 Id. at 9-10. 
173 Id. at 10. 
174 Id.  
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package in the next year.175 To ensure over time that EHB-defined packages are 
affordable and offer reasonable coverage, the Committee also recommended that the 
Secretary, working in collaboration with others, develop a strategy for controlling 
rates of growth in healthcare spending across all sectors in line with the rate of 
growth in the economy.176  
The Committee’s fifth major set of recommendations related to an NBAC. That 
is, the Secretary should establish an NBAC, staffed by HHS but appointed through a 
nonpartisan process, such as the Office of the Comptroller General of the United 
States.177 The Committee recommended that the NBAC should: (1) by January 1, 
2013, advise the Secretary on a research plan and data requirements for updating the 
EHB Package; (2) starting in 2015 for implementation in 2016, make 
recommendations annually to the Secretary regarding any changes to the EHB 
Package by applying the Committee’s recommended criteria relating to the 
aggregate and individual content of the EHB Package, any changes to the premium 
target, and any mechanisms that would enhance the evidence base of the EHB 
Package and its potential for promoting value; and (3) advise the Secretary on 
conducting and using the results of a periodic national public deliberative process to 
inform its recommendations around updates to the EHB Package.178 
E. THE HHS ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN OF 2011 
Following the release of the Consensus Report, HHS held an additional series of 
“listening sessions” with consumers, providers, employers, plans, state 
representatives, and other stakeholders in different cities across the United States.179 
During these sessions, some consumer and provider representatives expressed their 
concern regarding the Committee’s emphasis in its Consensus Report on cost over 
comprehensiveness of benefits, the need for the Secretary to spell out specific, 
uniform benefits in regulations, and the fact that small group plans may not represent 
the typical employer plan envisioned by ACA.180 On the other hand, some employer 
and health insurance representatives expressed their support for a more moderate 
benefit package, flexibility in the EHB Package across the country to reflect local 
preferences and practices, and benchmarking the EHB Package to small employer 
plans.181 
On December 16, 2011, HHS released its Essential Health Benefits Bulletin.182 
The EHB Bulletin provides information and solicits comments on a regulatory 
approach that HHS plans to propose to define the EHB Package.183 More 
specifically, the EHB Bulletin outlines HHS’s goal of pursuing an approach that 
will: (1) encompass the ten ACA-required categories of benefits; (2) reflect typical 
employer health benefit plans; (3) reflect balance among the ten ACA-required 
categories of benefits; (4) account for diverse health needs across many populations; 
(5) ensure that there are no incentives for coverage decisions, cost sharing, or 
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176 Id. at 10-11. 
177 Id. at 11-12. 
178 Id.  
179 EHB BULLETIN, supra note 23, at 3. 
180 See id. at 3. 
181 See id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 1. 
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reimbursement rates to discriminate impermissibly against individuals because of 
their age, disability, or expected length of life; (6) ensure compliance with 
MHPAEA; (7) provide states a role in defining the EHB Package; and (8) balance 
comprehensiveness and affordability for those purchasing coverage.184 
Given the Committee’s recommendations in its Consensus Report, including the 
Committee’s recommendation that the Secretary’s initial guidance should list 
standard benefit inclusions and exclusions at a level of specificity at least 
comparable to current best practice in the private and public insurance market, the 
content of the EHB Bulletin is surprising. In the EHB Bulletin, HHS explains its 
intent not to propose one comprehensive, specific benefit package for all health 
plans in the nation to follow.185 Instead, HHS intends to leave the states broad 
discretion in defining the EHB Package by allowing each state to select a benchmark 
plan in that state.186 The selected benchmark plan would serve as a reference plan, 
reflecting both the scope of services and any limits offered by a typical employer 
plan in that state.187 According to statements made by the Secretary at a news 
conference, HHS’s goal is to ensure that state leaders can tailor health insurance 
requirements to local conditions and priorities; that is, “[c]overage that works in 
Florida may not work in Nebraska.”188 HHS intends not only to allow health 
insurance issuers to adopt the scope of services and limits of the selected state 
benchmark, but also to vary the benchmarked benefits within certain parameters.189  
More specifically, HHS intends to propose that states select a single benchmark 
to serve as the standard for both exchange-offered qualified health plans in the state 
as well as non-exchange-offered individual and small group health plans in the 
state.190 HHS believes that the following four benchmark plans, at least for the two-
year (2014-2015) transition period immediately following the compliance date for 
the EHB Provision, best reflect ACA’s intent: (1) the largest plan by enrollment in 
any of the three largest small group insurance products in the state’s small group 
market; (2) any of the largest three state employee health benefit plans by 
enrollment; (3) any of the largest three national Federal Employees Health Benefit 
Program (FEHBP) plan options by enrollment; or (4) the largest insured commercial 
non-Medicaid HMO operating in the state.191 HHS intends to assess the benchmark 
process for year 2016 and beyond based on evaluation and feedback.192 
If a state does not exercise the option to select a benchmark health plan, HHS 
intends to propose that the default benchmark plan for the state will be the largest 
plan by enrollment in the largest product in the state’s small group market.193 In light 
of ACA’s requirement that states defray the costs of state-mandated benefits in 
excess of the EHB Package for individuals enrolled in any qualified health plan 
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either in the individual market or in the small group market,194 if a state chooses in 
transitional years 2014 and 2015 a benchmark such as the FEHBP plan that may not 
include some or all of the state’s mandated benefits, the state would be required to 
cover the costs of those mandates outside the state EHB Package.195 On the other 
hand, if a state chooses a benchmark subject to state mandates, such as a small group 
market plan, that benchmark would include those mandates in the state EHB 
Package.196 HHS intends to evaluate the benchmark approach for calendar year 2016 
and develop an approach that may exclude some state benefit mandates from 
inclusion in the state EHB Package.197 
HHS recognizes that not every state-selected benchmark plan will cover all ten 
categories of ACA-required services.198 For example, some selected benchmark 
plans may not include habilitative services, pediatric oral and vision services, or 
mental health and substance use disorder services (especially in light of MHPA and 
MHPAEA, neither of which contains a mandatory mental health or substance use 
disorder benefit).199 HHS intends to propose that if a selected benchmark is missing 
an ACA-required benefit category, the benefit category must nevertheless be 
covered by health plans required to offer the EHB Package.200 Stated another way, a 
state may need to supplement the benchmark plan to cover all ten of the ACA-
required benefit categories.201 HHS intends to propose that if a benchmark plan is 
missing one or more categories of required benefits, the state must supplement the 
missing categories using the benefits from any other benchmark option.202 In a state 
with a default benchmark with missing categories, the benchmark plan would be 
supplemented using the largest plan in the benchmark type (e.g., small group plans 
or state employee plans of FEHBP) by enrollment offering the benefit.203 If none of 
the benchmark options in that benchmark type offer the benefit, the benefit will be 
supplemented using the FEHBP plan with the largest enrollment.204  
HHS also intends to propose that mental health parity (i.e., MHPA as expanded 
by MHPAEA) applies in the context of health plans required to provide the EHB 
Package, consistent with ACA’s statutory extension of federal mental health parity 
law to qualified health plans discussed in Part III.C, supra.205 
HHS further intends to propose that health plan benefits be “substantially equal” 
to the benefits of the benchmark plan selected by the state and modified as necessary 
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to reflect the ten ACA-required service categories.206 More specifically, HHS intends 
to propose that insurers have some flexibility to adjust benefits, including both the 
specific services covered and any quantitative limits, provided that they continue to 
cover all ten of the ACA-required benefit categories.207 According to HHS, 
permitting some flexibility will: (1) provide greater choice to consumers; (2) 
promote plan innovation through coverage and design options; and (3) ensure that 
plans providing the EHB Package offer a certain minimum level of benefits.208 HHS 
also intends to consider permitting benefit substitutions within and across each of the 
ten ACA-required benefit categories.209 
Again, HHS’s purpose in issuing the EHB Bulletin is to provide information 
regarding its current intentions with respect to regulations it plans to propose in the 
future.210 The EHB Bulletin is not, then, a formal set of proposed regulations 
designed to satisfy the Federal Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment 
rule-making process. Like proposed rules, however, HHS is welcoming public input 
regarding the EHB Bulletin and received comments through January 31, 2012.211 As 
of this writing, HHS has yet to issue proposed or final regulations implementing the 
EHB Provision. 
Following January 1, 2014, the compliance deadline for the EHB Provision, 
HHS estimates that 4.8 million Americans who purchase health insurance in the 
individual market will gain some substance abuse coverage at parity with medical 
and surgical benefits and that 2.3 million Americans who purchase health insurance 
in the same market will gain some mental health coverage at parity with medical and 
surgical benefits.212 However, the extent to which specific mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits ultimately are required to be provided to a specific 
insured depends on whether HHS adopts its intended approach described in the EHB 
Bulletin in final regulations and, if so, the benchmark plan that is actually selected 
by (or defaulted to in) each state,213 the extent to which insurers are permitted to 
adjust the benchmark benefits, and the extent to which HHS allows service 
substitutions within and across the ten ACA-required benefit categories.214 If a state 
selects (or is defaulted to) a benchmark plan with modest mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits, many individuals with mental illness, including 
alcohol and drug addiction, may not have a federal legal right to insurance benefits 
that will cover all of the inpatient and outpatient services that are recommended for 
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their conditions.215 On the other hand, if a state selects (or is defaulted to) a 
benchmark plan with comprehensive mental health and substance use disorder 
benefits, a greater number of individuals with mental illness in that state will have a 
federal legal right to insurance coverage of medically necessary evidence-based 
mental health treatments, unless HHS allows health plans in the state to substantially 
adjust away from the benchmarked mental health benefits or substitute benefits in 
one of the other nine ACA-required categories for the benchmarked mental health 
benefits. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL  
This Part IV analyzes the initial steps taken by HHS to implement the EHB 
Provision,216 with a focus on the potentially negative clinical implications for 
individuals with mental health and substance use disorders and the potentially 
negative cost implications for health plans. Thus far, HHS understandably has 
focused on the EHB Package as a whole with scant attention devoted to mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits. On page 5 of the EHB Bulletin, HHS 
briefly notes that not all plans and health insurance products cover mental health and 
substance use disorder services.217 And, on page 12 of the EHB Bulletin, HHS 
briefly notes that mental health and substance use disorder services are part of the 
EHB Package and that ACA extends federal mental health parity law to the 
individual health plan setting and the exchange-offered qualified health plan 
setting.218 Other than these two points, HHS has not focused on the particular issues 
surrounding mental health and substance use disorder benefits in publicly available 
documentation relating to its initial implementation of the EHB Package. 
HHS’s scant attention to mental health and substance use disorder benefits 
likely is due to the scant attention received by such benefits in the Committee’s 
Workshop Report and Consensus Report. In the Workshop Report, the Committee 
explained that “time constraints prohibited the [C]ommittee from hearing testimony 
related to each of the[] [ten ACA-required] categories in detail.”219 Chapter 7 of the 
Workshop Report does highlight some testimony specifically relating to mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits, however.220 Dr. Kenneth Wells of the 
David Geffen School of Medicine at UCLA, Dr. Kavita Patel of the Semel Institute 
for Neuroscience and Human Behavior at UCLA, and Mr. Paul Samuels of the Legal 
Action Center and the Coalition for Whole Health provided important testimony 
regarding the need for access to a range of evidence-based mental health and 
substance use disorder treatments, the fact that mental health treatments must 
recognize the chronic (not just acute) dimensions of mental illness, and the need for 
collaboration and integration of services across the mental health, substance use 
disorder, and physical health sectors.221 Individually, Dr. Wells also briefly 
addressed the association between mental illness and physical illness (including the 
fact that individuals with mental illness have a higher prevalence of physical illness), 
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the role of mental illness in premature mortality and morbidity, and the cost 
effectiveness of mental health treatments when viewed in light of societal costs 
associated with mental illness.222 Dr. Patel also briefly addressed the importance of 
covering community-based mental healthcare, including the services provided by lay 
community workers and social caseworkers, citing the efficacy of community-based 
mental healthcare as reported in the National Institute of Mental Health’s 
Community Partners in Care study, which focused on the quality of mental 
healthcare provided to individuals with depression in Los Angeles223 as well as the 
Mental Health Infrastructure and Training Project, which focused on the mental 
healthcare needs of individuals with depression and post-traumatic stress disorder in 
post-Katrina New Orleans.224 Finally, Mr. Samuels briefly addressed the importance 
of treating mental illness in light of co-morbidity problems.225 Mr. Samuels 
explained that twenty-five percent of hospital admissions are directly related to 
untreated mental illness and substance use disorders, and the failure of insurers to 
adequately cover mental illness “cost[s] a lot of money” because individuals with 
untreated mental illness frequently develop physical illnesses (including heart 
disease and liver failure) when their underlying mental illnesses are not addressed.226 
Mr. Samuels concluded by stating that, “[a]ddressing these unmet [mental health] 
needs ‘will save lives and huge amounts of money.’”227 Other than presenting these 
three brief pieces of testimony, the Workshop Report did not specifically focus on 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits. 
The Consensus Report also focused little on mental health and substance use 
disorder benefits other than recognizing that not all health plans cover substance 
abuse detoxification services,228 that mental health and substance abuse coverage in 
individual health plans has varied more than in small group health plans, with 
coverage criteria being more influenced by state mandates,229 that mental health and 
substance use disorder services appear less likely to be covered in standard 
commercial subscriber contracts,230 and that, in terms of defining the EHB Package, 
areas of particular complexity include mental health services.231 
This Part IV seeks to remedy the informational and research limitations in 
HHS’s initial steps towards implementing the EHB Package. Perhaps the primary 
theme of the Workshop Report, the Consensus Report, and the EHB Bulletin with 
respect to all ten of the ACA-required benefit categories was the perceived tension 
between developing a comprehensive EHB Package and keeping healthcare costs 
down.232 The Workshop Report presented many pieces of testimony that addressed 
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the “clear tension between the desire to make the EHB [P]ackage as comprehensive 
as possible and the need to make the EHB [P]ackage affordable . . . .”233 Dr. Louis 
Jacques, Director of the Coverage & Analysis Group at the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, specifically addressed the “competing needs of generosity and 
affordability.”234 The Consensus Report also focused on comprehensiveness of 
benefits versus cost: “If the package of benefits is too narrow, health insurance 
might be meaningless; if it is too broad, insurance might become too expensive.”235 
The EHB Bulletin also stated as one of HHS’s mains goals “balancing 
comprehensiveness and affordability.”236 
Part IV argues that the intense focus on the perceived relationship between the 
comprehensiveness of benefits and healthcare costs in the Workshop Report, 
Consensus Report, and EHB Bulletin might be misplaced in the context of mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits. More specifically, this Part IV urges 
HHS to consider the current empirical literature suggesting that, holding other non-
mental health and substance use disorder benefits equal, the availability and use of 
medically necessary mental health and substance use disorder benefits by individuals 
with mental illnesses may actually lower the total (that is, the combined physical and 
mental) healthcare costs for those individuals, thus making the provision of 
comprehensive inpatient, outpatient, and other mental health and substance use 
disorder benefits by health plans an economically efficient long-term decision.237 
Stated another way, this Part IV urges HHS to consider the possibility of long-term 
total healthcare cost returns on initial mental health treatment investments as HHS 
implements the Mental Health Benefit Sub-Provision.  
A. TRADITIONAL CONCERNS REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL 
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS AND HEALTHCARE COSTS238 
The belief that mandatory mental health and substance use disorder benefits and 
mental health parity will cause healthcare costs to rise is not new.239 As background, 
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health insurers historically have focused on the problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection when justifying mental health benefit disparities.240 In the context 
of mental healthcare, moral hazard refers to the concern that individuals who do not 
pay for 100% of the cost of their own mental healthcare will use more mental health 
services because they do not value these services at their full cost.241 To control 
moral hazard in the context of mental healthcare, insurers traditionally have imposed 
lower inpatient day and outpatient visit maximums, as well as higher deductibles, 
co-payments, and co-insurance amounts, on mental healthcare.242 Notwithstanding 
insurers’ concerns regarding moral hazard in the context of mental healthcare, many 
of which may be linked to the three-decades-old RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment,243 recent studies demonstrate that the demand for mental health services 
is less price elastic than the demand for physical health services and that the current 
demand for mental health services is less price elastic than the demand for mental 
health services was twenty-five to thirty years ago.244 Recent studies also suggest 
                                                                                                                                            
parity . . . cite studies and reports that demonstrate that mental health parity will result in a significant 
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EXPERIMENT: A CLASSIC RAND STUDY SPEAKS TO THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE REFORM DEBATE 
(2006) (summarizing the HIE’s principal questions and findings). The study’s applicability to today’s 
managed care-dominated healthcare delivery market has recently been challenged: “[M]any have cited 
the RAND Health Insurance Experiment . . . which demonstrated that individuals are more likely to 
increase their mental health care usage when their personal cost-sharing for mental health care 
services fall than they are to increase their physical health care usage when their personal cost-sharing 
for physical health care services decreases. Because this experiment was conducted nearly thirty years 
ago, researchers recently tested to determine whether this result held true. Their results indicate that 
individuals’ sensitivity to changes in cost-sharing may have changed significantly over time.” Interim 
Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity 
Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. at 5424. 
244 See, e.g., Chad D. Meyerhoefer & Samuel H. Zuvekas, New Estimates of the Demand for 
Physical and Mental Health Treatment, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 297, 297 (2010) (“Results from our 
correlated random effects specification indicate that the price responsiveness of ambulatory mental 
health treatment has decreased substantially and is now slightly lower than physical health 
treatment . . . . This suggests that concerns over moral hazard alone do not warrant less generous 
coverage for mental health.”).  
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that deductibles (in both the traditional indemnity245 and managed care246 settings) 
and co-insurance amounts (in the managed care setting) have no impact and very 
little impact, respectively, on the demand for mental healthcare.247 Additional studies 
that analyze the impact of managed healthcare and behavioral health carve-out 
plans248 on demand for mental healthcare suggest that the implementation of 
managed behavioral healthcare undermines the assumed demand response as an 
efficiency argument against parity.249 As a result, economists now suggest that the 
imposition of higher deductibles, co-payments, and co-insurance amounts on mental 
healthcare may no longer be justified on efficiency grounds and that the traditional 
practice of unequal health insurance benefit sets may need to be revisited.250 
Traditionally, insurers also have been concerned with adverse selection; that is, 
the concern that in a healthcare market with voluntary insurance or multiple insurers, 
plans that offer generous mental health benefits will attract individuals with greater 
mental healthcare needs, leading to higher service usage and costs for those 
insurers.251 Historically, many insurers have not offered mental health benefits as a 
way of controlling adverse selection.252 Of course, the two pre-conditions to adverse 
selection (voluntary insurance and multiple insurers) have been at the heart of the 
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U.S. healthcare reform debate.253 Although Congress elected not to proceed with a 
single-payer system, ACA requires most individuals to maintain minimum essential 
health insurance coverage254 and requires exchange-offered qualified health plans, 
non-exchange-offered individual health plans, non-exchange-offered small health 
plans, Medicaid benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans, and state basic 
healthcare plans to include the EHB Package in certain health plan settings, 
including mental health and substance use disorder benefits.255 If upheld,256 these 
two sets of ACA provisions will lessen insurers’ risks relating to adverse selection 
beginning on the provisions’ compliance date of January 1, 2014.257 
B. EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ADDRESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MENTAL 
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS AND HEALTHCARE COSTS 
Perceived moral hazard and adverse selection concerns may continue to exist 
following January 1, 2014, however, because ACA does not currently require certain 
categories of health plans (including grandfathered health plans, large group health 
plans, and self-insured group health plans) to provide the EHB Package, including 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits.258 This Article is based on 
concern that such exempted health insurers—as well as those health plans that have 
significant leeway in designing their benefit packages and substituting essential 
services within and across ACA-required benefit categories—will continue to 
impose mental health benefit limitations and will provide minimal mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits, respectively, without recognizing the negative 
clinical and related cost implications of their benefit limitations and without taking 
into account the role of managed care in minimizing moral hazard and other 
efficiency concerns.259 To address these concerns, the current empirical literature 
regarding the relationship between mental health and substance use disorder benefits 
                                                           
253 See, e.g., David Brooks & Gail Collins, What’s Wrong with a Single-Payer System?, N.Y. 
TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 29, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/ 
07/29/whats-wrong-with-a-single-payer-system; Karen Davenport et al., Should Health Insurance Be 
Mandatory?, N.Y. TIMES ROOM FOR DEBATE (June 4, 2009, 7:43 PM), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/should-health-insurance-be-mandatory/ (five-
author debate examining the merits of mandatory health insurance). 
254 See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a), 124 Stat. 119, 242-44 (2010), amended by Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (“An applicable 
individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of 
the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such 
month.”).  
255 See supra Part III.C.  
256 See supra note 106. 
257 See, e.g., Frank et al., supra note 239, at 1702 (“Parity can improve the efficiency of 
insurance markets by eliminating wasteful forms of competition that are the result of adverse 
selection. Mandating a particular level of mental health care establishes a floor for coverage.”). 
258 See supra Part III.C; see also BERNADETTE FERNANDEZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41069, 
SELF-INSURED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 5 (2010) (“[G]roup health plan or health insurance 
coverage . . . in which a person was enrolled on the date of enactment [of PPACA] is grandfathered 
and exempt from most insurance reforms.”). 
259 See, e.g., Goplerud Statement, supra note 239, at 9 (discussing several economic, social, and 
other implications of untreated mental illness); Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete 
Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5423-24 (Feb. 
2, 2010) (discussing several economic implications of mental health benefit restrictions and 
recognizing that the moral hazard problem can be controlled through managed behavioral healthcare); 
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 420 (discussing the clinical implications of mental 
health benefit restrictions). 
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and healthcare costs is presented below. As discussed in more detail below, a 
number of studies suggest that mental health benefit limitations may be associated 
with a lack of access to mental healthcare and untreated mental illness.260 Studies 
also suggest that untreated mental illness may increase total healthcare costs over 
and above the cost of treating the mental illness, perhaps because individuals who 
have a mental illness are more likely to have a physical illness261 and because 
untreated mental illness can worsen the prognosis of, prolong the period of recovery 
from, and increase the risk of mortality associated with physical illness.262 Finally, a 
number of studies suggest that treating mental illness may either decrease or not 
statistically significantly increase total healthcare costs, even taking into account the 
costs of the provided mental health treatment.263  
In the early 1990s, researchers affiliated with the Group Health Cooperative of 
Puget Sound (“GHC”) desired to better understand the burden of depression on 
individual patients and society as a whole.264 As background, the researchers 
believed that diagnosis and treatment of depression in individuals could yield a 
societal return on investment by lowering rates of unemployment and disability, but 
the researchers were also aware of the need to understand and control healthcare 
costs as part of any policy recommendation or initiative.265 The researchers thus set 
out to investigate the relationship between untreated depression and total healthcare 
costs in 6257 GHC health maintenance organization (HMO) members who were 
eighteen years of age or older and were diagnosed with depression made during an 
outpatient visit between April 1, 1992, and December 31, 1992.266 Using 
computerized visit-diagnosis data, pharmacy records, and cost-accounting data from 
GHC, the researchers compared overall healthcare costs for primary care patients 
with recognized depression and overall healthcare costs for age- and gender-matched 
patients without depression.267 The researchers found that the patients diagnosed 
with depression had higher annual healthcare costs ($4246 versus $2371), and fifty 
to seventy-five percent higher costs for every category of care, including the primary 
care setting, all medical specialties, the medical inpatient setting, and the pharmacy 
                                                           
260 See, e.g., David R. McKusick et al., Trends in Mental Health Insurance Benefits and Out-of-
Pocket Spending, 5 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL’Y ECON. 71, 71 (2002) (“Insurance benefits can have a 
large effect on whether one is able to access health care services . . . . When insurance covers more 
limited expenditures, more must be paid out-of-pocket by the insured and there is less incentive to use 
services and more financial risk.”). 
261 See, e.g., Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. at 5423-24 (“Mental health and physical health 
are interrelated, and individuals with poor mental health are more likely to have physical health 
problems as well.”). 
262 See, e.g., id. at 5424 (“[T]here is evidence that comorbid depression worsens the prognosis, 
prolongs recovery and may increase the risk of mortality associated with physical illness.”); RACHEL 
SETHI ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., Pub. No. SMA-06-4177, DESIGNING EMPLOYER-SPONSORED MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS 14 
(2006) (reporting that depression following surgery for myocardial infarction is common but if left 
untreated can nearly double the risk of death eighteen months after heart surgery). 
263 See Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. at 5424 (“Increased access and utilization of mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits could result in a reduction of medical/surgical costs for 
individuals afflicted with mental health conditions and substance use disorders.”). 
264 See Gregory E. Simon et al., Health Care Costs of Primary Care Patients with Recognized 
Depression, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 850, 850 (1995). 
265 See id. 
266 Id. at 851. 
267 Id. at 852. 
504 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 38 NO. 2&3 2012 
and laboratory settings.268 The researchers concluded not only that the diagnosis of 
depression was associated with a twofold increase in use of health services269 but 
also that the greater medical utilization exceeded the costs that would be associated 
with treating the depression.270 As part of their conclusion, the researchers 
recommended that policy decisions regarding the scope of mental health benefits 
take into account the association between depression and total healthcare costs.271 
In 1997, researchers affiliated with GHC published the results of a second study 
designed “to examine whether depressive symptoms in older adults contribute to the 
increased cost of general medical services.”272 The researchers conducted a four-year 
(1989-1993) prospective study of 2558 older-than-sixty-five adults in GHC.273 
Through a mail survey and telephone interviews, the researchers measured each 
participant’s depressive symptoms at baseline (1989), at two years (1991), and at 
four years (1993).274 The researchers then compared each patient’s depressive 
symptoms to data obtained from GHC’s cost accounting system relating to each 
patient’s total healthcare costs.275 The researchers found that in the cohort of older 
adults studied, depressive symptoms were common, persistent, and associated with a 
significant increase in the cost of general medical services.276 More specifically, the 
researchers found that patients with significant depression at baseline had higher 
median costs ($2147) during the first year after baseline than patients without 
depression ($1461).277 Patients with significant depressive symptoms at baseline also 
had higher median costs at year four ($15,423) than patients without depressive 
symptoms ($10,152).278 The researchers also found that the increase in the cost of 
general medical services associated with depression was spread over all components 
of healthcare.279 During the year following baseline, for example, patients with 
depression had a higher number of inpatient admissions, outpatient visits, laboratory 
tests, emergency department visits, prescriptions, ancillary visits, and optometry 
visits.280 The researchers further found that the increase in the cost of general 
medical services was not accounted for by an increase in specialty mental 
healthcare,281 and that even after adjusting for differences in age, sex, and severity of 
                                                           
268 Id. at 850-52. 
269 Id. at 854 (“These data demonstrate markedly higher health care costs among HMO patients 
with recognized depression . . . . A twofold difference in total cost between those diagnosed as having 
depression and the comparison group was maintained over 12 months of observation, suggesting a 
chronic component to utilization differences.”). 
270 Id. at 855 (“In this 9-month sample of HMO primary patients with recognized depression, 
depression-related specialty mental health care and antidepressant drugs accounted for approximately 
$3.8 million, while greater use of general medical services accounted for $8.9 million over 1 year.”). 
See generally Interim Final Rules Under the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, 75 Fed. Reg. 5410, 5424 (Feb. 2, 2010) (explaining, for example, 
that “comorbid depression has been shown to increase the costs of medical care, over and above the 
costs of treating the depression itself.”). 
271 Simon et al., supra note 264, at 855. 
272 Jürgen Unützer et al., Depressive Symptoms and the Cost of Health Services in HMO Patients 
Aged 65 Years and Older, 277 JAMA 1618, 1618 (1997). 
273 Id. at 1618-19. 
274 Id. at 1619.  
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276 Id. at 1618. 
277 Id. at 1620. 
278 Id.  
279 Id. at 1618, 1621. 
280 Id. at 1620. 
281 Id. at 1618, 1621. 
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chronic medical illness, the increase in healthcare costs remained significant.282 The 
researchers formally concluded that depressive symptoms in older adults are 
associated with a significant increase—roughly fifty percent—in the total cost of 
general medical services.283 The researchers also suggested that mental health 
insurance benefit disparities might be short-sighted because they ultimately may 
increase total healthcare costs.284 
Similar findings have been shown in other healthcare delivery settings. In 2009, 
researchers affiliated with Massachusetts General Hospital and Massachusetts 
Institution of Technology published the results of a study designed to better 
understand the interaction between depression and the cost of non-mental healthcare 
in eleven chronic co-morbid diseases.285 To that end, the researchers examined the 
insurance claims of 618,780 patients enrolled in self-insured, private healthcare 
plans based primarily in Texas, California, and across the eastern seaboard.286 The 
researchers examined the insurance records, dating from September 1, 2004, to 
August 31, 2005, for total annual non-mental health costs in eleven different disease 
categories, including asthma, back pain, congestive heart failure, coronary artery 
disease, diabetes, epilepsy, headache, hypertension, intervertebral disc disease, 
obesity, and joint pain.287 In each disease cohort, the researchers calculated median 
annual non-mental health cost for individuals with and without depression.288 The 
researchers found that patients with depression had higher median per-patient annual 
non-mental health costs than patients without depression in all eleven diseases 
studied.289 The per-patient difference in non-mental health costs between non-
depressed and depressed patients ranged from $1570 in obesity to $15,240 in 
congestive heart failure.290 The ratio of cost between non-depressed and depressed 
patients ranged from 1.5 in obesity to 2.9 in epilepsy.291 The researchers also found 
that the median annual pharmaceutical costs for the depressed patients were 
consistently higher than the pharmaceutical costs for the non-depressed patients, 
with a difference ranging from $590 in obesity to $1410 in epilepsy.292 Finally, the 
researchers found that “each of the 11 chronic co-morbid diseases was more 
prevalent in the depressed cohort than in the non-depressed cohort” (with the ratio of 
                                                           
282 Id. at 1618, 1620-21. 
283 Id. at 1618, 1621. 
284 Id. at 1622 (“Our findings on the costs of health services are important because by the year 
2040, persons older than 65 years are projected to make up 21% of the population and consume almost 
half of the nation’s health care resources. Medicare currently spends only about 3% of its resources on 
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285 See Charles A. Welch et al., Depression and Costs of Health Care, 50 PSYCHOSOMATICS 392, 
392 (2009). 
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prevalence between non-depressed and depressed patients ranging from 1.4 in 
coronary artery disease and hypertension to 6.8 in obesity).293 
Given this data, the Massachusetts-based researchers formally concluded that, 
even when controlling for the number of chronic co-morbid diseases, depressed 
patients had significantly higher costs than non-depressed patients in a magnitude 
consistent across the eleven chronic co-morbid diseases.294 The researchers 
suggested several potential reasons for their findings, including the possibility that 
depressed patients engage in self-neglect, including non-compliance with 
recommended healthcare.295 By way of explanation, the researchers noted that other 
studies have shown that self-neglect in diabetes and heart disease patients is 
correlated with higher utilization of emergency room, outpatient, inpatient, and 
specialty services.296 The researchers also identified as a possible cause the 
association between depression and “higher rates of harmful lifestyle factors such as 
smoking, overeating, and lack of physical activity,” as well as more severe 
pathophysiology across all chronic disease categories.297 Finally, the researchers 
raised the question, but were unable to answer, whether there may be metabolic 
factors associated with depression that exacerbate the pathophysiology of co-morbid 
diseases.298  
Similar depression-to-cost findings also have been demonstrated in the public 
healthcare program setting. In 2009, researchers at the University of Washington, 
Columbia University, the National Institute of Mental Health, and Green Ribbon 
Health published their analysis of the healthcare claims of 14,902 Medicare 
beneficiaries who were enrolled in a pilot disease management program designed to 
investigate the association between depression and total healthcare costs as well as 
specific components of healthcare costs.299 The majority of the Medicare 
beneficiaries studied had diabetes, many had congestive heart failure, and 
approximately twenty percent had both diabetes and congestive heart failure.300 The 
researchers divided the beneficiaries into three mental health status groups: 2108 
beneficiaries who had been diagnosed with depression, 1081 beneficiaries who had 
not been officially diagnosed with depression but who screened positive when given 
a questionnaire or who reported taking antidepressant medication, and 11,713 
beneficiaries who did not have depression.301 The researchers found that the 
beneficiaries diagnosed with depression incurred approximately $22,960 in total 
                                                           
293 Id. at 395. 
294 Id. Other studies report similar findings. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arnow et al., Relationships 
Among Depression, Chronic Pain, Chronic Disabling Pain, and Medical Costs, 60 PSYCHIATRIC 
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healthcare costs over one year, while those without depression incurred costs of 
approximately $11,956 over the same year.302 Medicare beneficiaries with possible 
depression based on depression screening or reported antidepressant use incurred 
$14,365 in total annual healthcare costs.303  
The researchers found that the beneficiaries with diagnosed depression spent 
significantly more in almost all healthcare cost categories, including home 
healthcare, skilled nursing care, outpatient non-mental healthcare, inpatient non-
mental healthcare, physician services, and durable medical equipment.304 The 
beneficiaries with diagnosed depression did not, however, spend more money on 
specialty mental healthcare compared to the beneficiaries without depression.305 
Total mental healthcare costs accounted for less than two percent of total healthcare 
costs for the beneficiaries with depression.306 The researchers formally concluded 
that among the Medicare beneficiaries with chronic medical illness whose data was 
used in the study, those who also had depression both had significantly higher 
healthcare costs and were not receiving enough mental healthcare.307 The researchers 
theorized that the higher Medicare co-payments that applied to outpatient mental 
healthcare (fifty percent at the time of the study, now forty percent) compared to 
outpatient physical healthcare (twenty percent then and now) posed an obstacle to 
the receipt of needed mental healthcare.308 The researchers suggested in their 
conclusion that evidence-based depression care may yield long-term cost savings.309 
Given the literature showing an association between untreated mental illness 
and healthcare cost increases, a number of research groups began to investigate 
whether treatment of mental illness could produce subsequent decreases in total 
healthcare costs. To that end, researchers affiliated with GHC published in 2006 the 
results of a study investigating the association between depression treatment and 
healthcare costs over the subsequent six months.310 In their research, the study 
authors analyzed data obtained from GHC associated with 1814 patients who met the 
criteria for major depressive episode and entered treatment.311 Thirty-four percent of 
the patients whose data were analyzed achieved remission from depression, thirty-
seven percent improved but did not meet criteria for remission, and twenty-nine 
percent had persistent major depression three to four months later.312 After adjusting 
for baseline differences in the severity of each patient’s initial depression and 
expected healthcare costs, the study authors found that mean health services costs 
over the six months following acute-phase treatment were $2012 for those achieving 
remission, $2571 for those improved but not remitted, and $3094 for those with 
                                                           
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 509. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. at 508. 
307 Id. at 509. 
308 Id. at 510. 
309 Id. 
310 Gregory E. Simon et al., Recovery from Depression Predicts Lower Health Services Costs, 67 
J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 1226 (2006). 
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persistent major depression.313 The study authors also found that average costs for 
depression treatment, including antidepressant prescriptions, outpatient visits, and 
mental health inpatient care, ranged from $429 in the full remission group to $585 in 
the persistent depression group.314 The authors formally concluded that remission 
from depression is associated with significantly lower subsequent healthcare 
services utilization and healthcare costs across the full range of mental health and 
general medical services compared with persistent depression.315 
Similar findings have been demonstrated in a variety of other healthcare 
delivery contexts. In 2008, for example, researchers published the results of a 
randomized controlled trial, Improving Mood: Promoting Access to Collaborative 
Treatment (IMPACT), which was designed to investigate the long-term effects on 
total healthcare costs of participation in a depression treatment program compared 
with usual primary care.316 Five hundred and fifty-one participants from two 
IMPACT trial sites who satisfied clinical criteria for either depression or dysthymia 
were randomly assigned to the IMPACT intervention group or to a usual primary 
care group.317 The patients assigned to the IMPACT group had access for one year to 
a depression care manager who provided education, behavioral activation, support of 
antidepressant medication management prescribed by their regularly primary care 
provider, and problem-solving treatment in primary care for up to twelve months.318 
The patients assigned to the usual primary care group were told that they met the 
criteria for major depression or dysthymia and were encouraged to follow up with 
their primary care provider for treatment.319 The researchers obtained from the trial 
sites cost accounting data that tracked costs associated with all healthcare delivered 
to the patients.320 
The study authors found that the patients who were assigned to the IMPACT 
group had lower mean total healthcare costs ($29,422) over the four-year period 
compared to the patients who were assigned to the usual-care group ($32,785), 
which represented a cost savings among the IMPACT patients of $3363 per patient 
on average during four years.321 The IMPACT patients had lower healthcare costs 
than the usual-care patients in every healthcare cost category observed, including 
outpatient mental health costs, inpatient mental health costs, outpatient medical 
costs, inpatient medical and surgical costs, pharmacy costs, and other outpatient 
costs.322 The researchers formally concluded that, when compared with usual 
primary care, the IMPACT program is associated with a high probability of lower 
total healthcare costs during a four-year period.323 The researchers also stated that 
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their findings support the implementation of programs and policies that facilitate 
coverage of—and reimbursement for—treatment of mental illnesses such as 
depression and dysthymia.324 
The studies described above were conducted in populations of patients with 
traditional mental illnesses, such as depression and dysthymia.325 Researchers also 
have investigated the relationship between treatment of other mental illnesses, such 
as alcohol and drug abuse, and healthcare costs as well as a number of other 
variables, including employment, drug and alcohol consumption, and criminal 
activity.326 These studies show that treating alcohol and drug abuse can yield 
significant clinical and economic returns on an employer’s or public healthcare 
program’s initial treatment investment. For example, a group of researchers 
published in 2000 the results of a study conducted in the State of Washington that 
examined the clinical and economic returns on addiction treatment provided to 263 
Medicaid-eligible drug addiction treatment clients.327 The clinical and economic 
returns were calculated based on an analysis of several variables (each of which was 
assigned a cost), including number of days experiencing medical problems, 
overnight hospitalizations for medical treatments, emergency room visits for medical 
treatment, clinic or physician visits for medical treatments, days experiencing 
psychological or emotional problems, days in inpatient psychiatric treatment, days in 
hospital outpatient psychiatric treatment, income received from employment, money 
spent on alcohol, money spent on drugs, and days engaged in illegal activities.328 
The study demonstrated that each dollar invested in full-continuum (FC) addiction 
care (defined as care that begins with an inpatient hospital or residential stay, is 
followed by intensive outpatient services, and is followed by outpatient aftercare) 
and partial-continuum (PC) addiction care (defined as care that begins with intensive 
outpatient care and is followed by additional less intensive outpatient care) yielded 
returns of approximately 9.7 and 23.3 times their initial investments, respectively.329 
The study also demonstrated that the average cost of treatment amounted to $2530 
for FC addiction care and $1138 for PC addiction care, and that the average 
economic benefit amounted to $20,363 for FC addiction care and $12,130 for PC 
addiction care, producing a net economic benefit of both FC and PC addiction 
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care.330 The study authors formally concluded that their results strongly suggest that 
both FC and PC addiction care can generate positive and significant net benefits to 
society.331 
In addition to clinically oriented studies that use private health plan and public 
healthcare program data to show an association between mental illness and total 
healthcare costs, a second line of research based primarily in economics suggests 
that the moral hazard concerns associated with mental health parity implementation 
may have been valid decades ago in the traditional indemnity setting,332 the same 
efficiency concerns are less valid under managed healthcare.333 This is especially 
true for managed mental healthcare provided through a behavioral health carve-out 
plan, which is a specialized managed behavioral health plan that is separate (or 
carved out) from an employer’s or group’s regular managed care organization and 
that has expertise in establishing specialty mental health provider networks, 
negotiating mental health provider payment rates, and managing utilization to affect 
the cost and supply of mental health services.334 The number of behavioral health 
carve-out plans has increased significantly, perhaps due to the carve-out plans’ 
documented role in reducing inpatient admissions, lengths of stays, and total 
spending on inpatient care.335 In theory, managed behavioral health carve-out plans 
eliminate unnecessary utilization at its source and on a case-by-case basis.336  
In one study published in 1998, three researchers tracked access, utilization, and 
costs of mental healthcare for a large, private, West Coast-based employer over nine 
years (1988-1996) during which managed care was introduced and mental health 
benefits were substantially expanded and carved out of the traditional medical plan 
by a behavioral health carve-out plan (“U.S. Behavioral Health”).337 In one of the 
first long-term reports of the cost trend under a managed behavioral health carve-out 
plan, the study authors reported a forty-three percent lower cost (including the 
administrative fee charged by U.S. Behavioral Health) per enrollee per month in 
1995 than in 1990, the year before the carve-out decision.338 The study authors 
attributed the cost savings in part to a decline in inpatient admissions and an 
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behavioral health carve-out plans); Ma & McGuire, supra note 249, at 54. 
335 See, e.g., Barry, Political Evolution, supra note 37, at 190 (noting growth of carve-out plans); 
Frank et al., supra note 239, at 1702 (noting tendency of carve-out plans to reduce spending); Ma & 
McGuire, supra note 249, at 54 (“The rapidly growing use of separate carve-out contracts has been 
stimulated by reports of very favorable cost experience for many payers, with some savings reported 
to be in the range of 40 percent or more.” (footnote omitted)). 
336 See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 37, at 423. 
337 See William Goldman, Joyce McCulloch & Roland Sturm, Costs and Use of Mental Health 
Services Before and After Managed Care, 17 HEALTH AFF. 40, 41 (1998). 
338 Id. at 45. 
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increased use of outpatient care.339 According to the study authors, “[t]he main result 
is that despite higher initial access to specialty care in the post period and 
substantially increased benefits, costs for mental healthcare declined dramatically in 
the first year and continued to decline slowly in the following five years.”340 The 
study authors concluded that the implementation of mental health parity in a 
managed behavioral health carve-out setting could yield long-run cost containment 
and that mental health parity implementation would not “brea[k] the bank.”341 
In a second study published in 1998, two Boston University economists 
examined the costs associated with a behavioral health carve-out plan initiated in 
July 1993 by the Group Insurance Commission (GIC) of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.342 The economists obtained data from GIC eligibility and health 
claims files dated July 1991 through June 1995, a period that included two years of 
pre-carve-out data and two years of post-carve-out data.343 The economists found a 
very significant cost reduction after the initiation of the carve-out plan.344 In the two 
years prior to the initiation of the carve-out plan (1992 and 1993), plan costs were 
$16.93 million and $14.82 million, respectively.345 In the two years following the 
initiation of the carve-out plan (1994 and 1995), plan costs were $9.32 million and 
$7.29 million, respectively.346 Average GIC payments per participant per month also 
significantly decreased from $13.92 in 1992 and $12.22 in 1993 to $6.04 in 1994 
and $4.77 in 1995.347 Overall, the economists found a fifty to sixty percent gross 
reduction in costs and an estimated thirty to forty percent minimum net reduction in 
costs after adjusting for a number of different trends, including a shifting enrollee 
case-mix, rising medical prices, and a downward drift in mental health and substance 
service use.348 The economists formally concluded that “by any standard, the data 
show a very significant cost reduction after the carve-out.”349 
In a third study published in 2008, three researchers from Harvard University 
investigated the demand response of mental health services to cost-sharing under 
                                                           
339 Id. at 46-47. 
340 Id. at 48. 
341 Id. (“[S]witching to managed care dramatically reduces costs even if benefits are increased. 
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and therefore are not a realistic policy option, ‘parity’ for SA in employer-sponsored health plans is 
affordable under comprehensively managed care.”).  
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349 Id. at 63. For similar findings, see also Richard G. Frank & Thomas G. McGuire, Savings 
from a Medicaid Carve-Out for Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services in Massachusetts, 48 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1147, 1152 (1997) (“The carve-out program for mental health and substance 
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managed healthcare and compared it to the demand response of mental health 
services to cost-sharing under traditional indemnity (fee-for-service) plans.350 More 
specifically, the researchers obtained data from the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey and analyzed the effect of prices on the probability of ambulatory mental 
health uses.351 The researchers found that the effect of the co-insurance rate on 
ambulatory mental health services demand under managed care plans was 
significantly smaller than that under indemnity plans and was not significantly 
different than zero.352 The researchers formally concluded that managed care, not 
out-of-pocket prices paid by consumers, controls rates of utilization.353 The 
researchers also stated in their conclusion that efficiency arguments against mental 
health parity may not apply to managed care settings.354 
In addition to research demonstrating that the moral hazard concerns associated 
with mental health parity may not apply in the managed care setting, a final line of 
research examining the actual costs associated with the implementation of mental 
health parity and mental health and substance use disorder benefits in particular 
healthcare delivery settings shows that mental health parity implementation has not 
increased total healthcare delivery costs. One such setting is the FEHBP, the largest 
employer-sponsored health insurance program in the United States that serves more 
than eight million federal employees, annuitants, and dependents.355 In January 
2001, the FEHBP instituted a mental health and substance abuse parity policy in 
compliance with a parity order issued by President Clinton in July 1999.356 The 
parity order required equality between the rates, terms, and conditions (including 
deductibles, co-payments, inpatient day limitations, and outpatient visit limitations) 
that applied to the FEHBP’s medical and surgical benefits and those that applied to 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits.357 At the time of its issuance, one 
concern associated with the parity order was that the FEHBP would incur large 
increases in both mental health service use and federal spending on mental health 
services.358 HHS thus commissioned a study to evaluate the effect of the parity order 
in the FEHBP on costs as well as other important indicators.359 The authors of the 
commissioned study concluded that the cost concerns were unfounded: “When 
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IN PREMIUMS IN THE FEHBP FROM MENTAL HEALTH PARITY (2005), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/05/mhsamemo.htm; FEHB FINAL REPORT, supra note 355, at 4, 6 
(identifying as key research questions: “Did FEHB plans incur additional expenses in implementing 
the parity policy?” and “How did the parity policy affect cost of [mental health and substance abuse] 
care to the beneficiary and [the Office of Personnel Management]?”).  
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coupled with management of care, implementation of parity in insurance benefits for 
behavioral health care can improve insurance protection without increasing total 
costs.”360 The study authors explained that their findings reflected little or no effect 
of mental health parity implementation on mental health services use and total 
spending.361  
The FEHBP is not alone in its mental health parity and mental health and 
substance use disorder benefit implementation cost experiences. Reports indicate 
that states with mental health parity legislation and mandatory mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits have had similar experiences. By several reports, 
California, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, and Vermont implemented mental health parity and/or 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits and subsequently experienced 
either lower costs or extremely modest cost increases (e.g., nineteen cents per 
member per month in Vermont) in the first year of implementation.362 Additional 
studies report that Maryland and North Carolina experienced decreased costs 
following the implementation of mental health parity and mental health and 
substance use disorder benefits when such parity coincided with the introduction of 
managed behavioral healthcare.363 
In summary, employers and insurers have offered a number of different reasons 
for their disparate physical and mental health insurance benefits or lack of mental 
health and substance use disorder benefits, including the argument that 
comprehensive mental health benefits will cause costs to rise. However, as discussed 
in this Part IV.B, the current health plan literature suggests that untreated mental 
illness may be associated with increases in total healthcare costs and that treatment 
of mental illness may be associated with decreases in total healthcare costs. In 
addition, the current mental health economics literature suggests that managed 
behavioral healthcare may significantly reduce—if not eliminate—the problem of 
moral hazard in the context of mental healthcare.364 Finally, recent studies of cost 
data obtained from healthcare delivery settings in which mental health parity and 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits has been implemented suggest that 
mental health benefits may have (at most) negligibly increased or (more typically) 
decreased total healthcare delivery costs in those settings.365 The current empirical 
literature thus may not support across-the-board concerns associated with the costs 
of comprehensive mental health and substance use disorder benefits. 
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C. A PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE AND SPECIFIC ESSENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH 
AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDER BENEFITS 
The primary theme of the Workshop Report, the Consensus Report, and the EHB 
Bulletin with respect to all ten of the ACA-required benefit categories was the 
perceived tension between the comprehensiveness of benefits and healthcare cost 
increases.366 Likely as a result of the intense focus on this perceived tension, the 
HHS plan identified in the EHB Bulletin is timid with respect to the 
comprehensiveness and specificity of the EHB Package.367 If HHS’s current plan is 
adopted, states will have broad discretion in defining the EHB Package (including, 
perhaps, a Package that contains modest mental health and substance use disorder 
benefits), health plans will have flexibility in adjusting benchmarked benefits 
(including adjustments that could further reduce mental health and substance use 
disorder benefits), and health plans may be permitted to substitute services within 
and across benefit categories (including substitutions away from mental health and 
substance use disorder services and toward services in one or more of the other nine 
ACA-required benefit categories).368 
This Part IV has shown that the intense focus on the perceived relationship 
between the comprehensiveness of benefits and healthcare cost increases in the 
Workshop Report, Consensus Report, and EHB Bulletin might be misplaced in the 
context of mental health and substance use disorder benefits. This Article thus 
proposes that HHS consider adopting a comprehensive essential mental health and 
substance use disorder benefit that includes, at a minimum, medically necessary and 
evidence-based inpatient and outpatient mental healthcare services, inpatient 
substance abuse detoxification services, inpatient and outpatient substance abuse 
rehabilitation services, emergency mental healthcare services, prescription drugs for 
mental health conditions, psychiatric disease management participation, and 
community-based mental healthcare services. The current literature suggests that the 
provision of these services to mentally ill individuals who need them may, in the 
long run, decrease or not increase total healthcare expenditures.  
One question that remains is how specific the EHB Package should be in terms 
of the required mental health and substance use services. For example, should 
regulations implementing the EHB Package specifically list the health conditions or 
medical or other criteria for which particular mental health treatments, such as 
individual psychotherapy, group counseling, particular name brand or generic 
psychiatric drugs, electroconvulsive therapy, deep brain stimulation, or inpatient 
detoxification and rehabilitation services, will be covered? As background, the 
“specific v. flexible” debate in healthcare reform is a perennial issue. The Clinton 
administration’s failed but incredibly specific Health Security Act of 1993 contained 
a sixty-one-page enumerated list of covered benefits.369 Both the FEHBP and the 
Massachusetts Health Care Reform Law, on the other hand, contain broadly defined 
benefit categories.370 The value of specificity versus flexibility continues to be 
debated, including in the statements made by speakers at the IOM workshops. On 
behalf of the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, for example, 
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Dr. Arnold Cohen stated that describing the EHB as specifically as possible “is the 
surest way to protect our patients against potential conflict or debate regarding 
medical necessity.”371 On the other hand, Ms. Katy Spangler, a Staff Member of the 
Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, referred to the ten ACA-
required benefit categories as “buckets of care” and explained that they were 
“intentionally left vague so that details of what plans would cover could be left to 
the marketplace.”372 Dr. Rex Cowdry of the Maryland Health Care Commission 
cautioned the Committee against “too much design specificity or standardization,” as 
this “prevents the kind of innovation needed to control health care costs.”373 Dr. 
David Guzick, Senior Vice President for Health Affairs and President of the 
University of Florida Shands Health System, urged the Committee to leave 
condition-specific decisions to the marketplace in order “to reflect evolving clinical 
knowledge, appropriate practices, and appropriate oversight at the state level by 
insurance commissioners.”374 Other stakeholders also believed that a flexible EHB 
Package would allow for innovation, including advances in technology and 
treatments.375 
On one hand, the literature discussed at Part IV.B suggests clinical and cost 
benefits of particular medically necessary mental health treatments and services, 
such as the disease management services provided to the individuals who 
participated in the IMPACT (2008) study376 and the FC and PC addiction care 
services provided to the individuals who participated in the State of Washington 
(2000) study.377 On the other hand, the evidence base for mental health and 
substance abuse care is rapidly changing and the ability of HHS or a state to update 
specific lists of services that are tied to specific health conditions, medical criteria, 
or other criteria may be unrealistic. I thus propose that the initial EHB Package 
include at least the following specific categories of mental health and substance 
abuse disorder services: inpatient and outpatient mental healthcare services, inpatient 
substance abuse detoxification services, inpatient and outpatient substance abuse 
rehabilitation services, emergency mental healthcare services, prescription drugs for 
mental health conditions, psychiatric disease management programs, and 
community-based mental healthcare services. I further propose that these specific 
categories of mental health and substance use disorder benefits, and any specific 
treatments or services provided under each category, be reviewed regularly to ensure 
a basis in the current medical and scientific literatures. I finally propose that the 
mental healthcare treatment and cost literature be reviewed on a regular basis. 
Should the findings of the mental healthcare treatment and cost literature change 
such that an initial mental health treatment investment is no longer a long-term value 
with respect to total healthcare costs (either due to changes in the way in which 
mental healthcare is managed, changes in the relationship between the cost of 
currently experimental but possibly future mental health treatments (such as deep 
brain stimulation) compared to total healthcare costs, or changes in any other 
variable), the proposals in this Article may need to be revisited. 
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